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Roles and Meanings of Informality in Transnational Accountability: the EU 
Migration Crisis in the Realm of Transnational Municipal Networks 
 
Fumie Nakamura 
 
Abstract 
 
This master thesis investigates the meanings and functions of transnational accountability by 
analyzing the informal means of organizing accountability in emerging transnational 
governance networks. In this regard, the study will shed light onto a transnational municipal 
network (TMN) named EUROCITIES to understand the new realm of transnational 
governance in greater detail and examine its potential for transcending accountability gaps 
among conventional state-based actors. Accountability will be construed as an institutional 
arrangement within a broader governance setting and investigated in terms of ‘to what’, ‘to 
whom’, and ‘by what means’. When transnationality enters the picture, new non-state actors 
earn presence on the one hand, while the three focal points of accountability relationship 
becomes obscured on the other, leading to the issue of accountability gap. In this conceptual 
framework, the project examines the accountability relationship of EUROCITIES as a single 
case study as an intersection of the concept, transnational realm, and real-life issue of the 
2015/2016 migration crisis, utilizing a qualitative inductive analysis. It concludes that 
EUROCITIES operates based on a new, more emancipatory sense of accountability to 
outperform the formal accountability, which makes it, both the secretariat and its member 
cities, an adaptive partner for the EU to address the accountability gap and the crisis.  
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Introduction 
This project investigates the meanings and functions of transnational accountability by 
analyzing the informal means of organizing accountability in emerging transnational 
governance networks. In this regard, the study will shed light onto a transnational municipal 
network (TMN) named EUROCITIES to understand the new realm of transnational 
governance in greater detail and examine its potential for transcending accountability gaps 
among conventional state-based actors. Accountability will be construed as an institutional 
arrangement within a broader governance setting and investigated in terms of ‘to what’, ‘to 
whom’, and ‘by what means’. When transnationality enters the picture, new non-state actors 
earn presence on the one hand, while the three focal points of accountability relationship 
becomes obscured on the other, leading to the issue of accountability gap. In this conceptual 
framework, the project examines the accountability relationship of EUROCITIES as a single 
case study as an intersection of the concept, transnational realm, and real-life issue, utilizing 
a qualitative inductive analysis.  
The 2015/2016 EU migration crisis has been selected in order to contextualize the 
conceptual phenomenon. As the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
referred to 2015 as “the year of Europe’s refugee crisis”, an unprecedented influx of refugees 
and asylum-seekers arrived at the EU’s external border across the sea and via land routes that 
year, overwhelming the administrative capacity of the receiving municipalities. After 
reaching the external border, the refugees traveled further, creating points of arrival, transit, 
and destination across the region. Today, the crisis is still an ongoing issue although its 
significance may differ depending on one’s standpoint. To many, for instance, the refugee 
crisis may have shifted into other facets, focusing on migration or movement within the 
Schengen Zone in general. It has exposed a rift in the EU’s solidarity, particularly in relation 
to the EU’s decision in the same year to impose the so-called ‘quota refugees’ on the member 
states as part of its relocation scheme.1 In the eyes of EU sceptics, on the other hand, it has 
become a crisis of their national identities. Needless to say, the crisis has been construed as 
                                               
1 More details can be found in Council Decision (EU) 2015/1523 of 14 September 2015 as well as Council 
Decision (EU) 2015/1601 of 22 September 2015 establishing provisional measures in the area of international 
protection for the benefit of Italy and Greece. 
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a humanitarian catastrophe that has evoked considerable public sympathy. Regardless of the 
stances, however, the provision of the necessary public services to those who have entered 
the EU as refugees necessitates not only an immediate action and a long-term vision, but also 
a seamless transfer of jurisdictions across national borders. This research, thus, interprets the 
phenomenon as “the crisis of EU governance” (Börzel, 2016, p.19) in the sense that the EU 
was unable to implement coordinated action across its member states and was confronted 
with a form of accountability gap. The urgency of the issue, the cross-boundary migration, 
and the disagreement in the crisis response among the EU member states make the EU 
refugee crisis a valuable case to explore transnational accountability and accountability gap. 
The thesis is organized into the following structure. The next chapter introduces the 
conceptual phenomenon of accountability as well as transnational accountability, and 
discusses the new dynamics which emerge when transnational networks enters the political 
and societal environment. Chapter 2 continues to set the foundations of this project by visiting 
the current academic research on TMNs by reviewing the existing understanding on what 
they are, what they do, and how they function leading to the discussion of the research gap 
between accountability and TMNs. Chapter 3 introduces the 2015/2016 EU migration crisis 
and explains the relevance of the event for contextualizing and understanding the practical 
and theoretical emergence of transnational networks. Chapter 4 combines the essence of the 
preceding chapters into a coherence research design and delivers the findings in details in 
order to realign them to the threefold research question of 1) To what do the actors of TMNs 
hold themselves accountable?, 2) To whom do the actors of TMNs hold themselves 
accountable? and 3) By what means do the actors of TMNs hold themselves accountable? 
Chapter 5 presents the findings and aligns them in order to respond to the research questions. 
Chapter 6 revisits the conceptual framework that are introduced in Chapter 1 and further 
assesses the roles and meanings of accountability within a TMN, and what it implies to the 
migration crisis. It concludes that EUROCITIES operates based on a new, more 
emancipatory sense of accountability to outperform the formal accountability, which makes 
it, both the secretariat and its member cities, an adaptive partner for the EU to address the 
accountability gap and the crisis.  
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Chapter 1. Conceptual Framework 
This chapter introduces a concept pivotal to this project, transnational accountability. It 
locates governance as a broader arrangement, in which the concept finds itself. Furthermore, 
it views accountability as an institutional arrangement. Based on these premises, the chapter 
reviews the existing definitions and meanings of the concept, followed by discussion of three 
focal points, accountability to what, to whom, and by what means (how), through which the 
existing literature navigates itself. Finally, the analysis will show that the emergence of 
transnationality adds complexities to the concept of accountability in a sense which broadens 
and blurs the three focal points and diverges from the state-based framework. 
 
1. What governance is 
As mentioned above, this thesis locates governance as a broader arrangement, in 
which accountability finds itself. Throughout this thesis, the governance is defined as “all 
processes of governing, whether undertaken by a government, market, or network, whether 
over a family, tribe, formal or informal organization, or territory, and whether through laws, 
norms, power, or language” (Bevir, 2012, p.1). The word governance, according to the 
author, embodies the shift in the focus away from ‘government’ and the hierarchical 
arrangement of actors (Ibid., p2), and toward ‘market’ and ‘network’ of actors, who can now 
govern, as well as the coordination and decision-making these new actors engage themselves 
in (Ibid., p.3). This, in turn, obscures the boundary between the state and society (Ibid., p.5), 
which he refers to as the ‘new’ governance. The new mode of governance is hybrid, multi-
jurisdictional, and plural, and involves multiple arrangements, levels of governance, and 
stakeholders as an interacting, connected whole (Ibid., p7). In other words, new governance, 
with its arrangements and actors, traverses and crisscrosses the traditional jurisdictional 
divisions. In this light, Kjaer (2004) formulates the concept of governance that is “broader 
than government” and entails “steering and the rules of the game” (p.7).  
 
2. Creating a conceptual framework for transnational accountability 
For the purpose of capturing both the agency and agents, this project views 
accountability as an ‘institutional’ arrangement, in that institutions “prescribe appropriate 
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behavior for different actors in different situations” (Olsen, 2013, p.450). Accountability as 
an institutional arrangement can be further categorized into a formal and informal realm. 
North’s (1990) conceptualization of institutions as the “rules of the game” (p.3) in social life 
and that these institutions were regulated both by ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ constraints. Rested 
on this tradition, Helmke and Levitsky (2004), for instance, define the former as “rules and 
procedures that are created, communicated and enforced through channels widely accepted 
as official” (p.727), whereas the latter refers to “socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that 
are created (Ibis.).  
Informality and informal institutions entail various meanings and are associated with 
formal institutions positively and negatively, but the distinction in between the two can be 
relatively vague and context-dependent. However, scholars share one conviction in common; 
informal institutions matter. Morris and Polese (2016) examine informality in higher 
education institutions and shed light onto the practice of ‘informal payments’ that are initiated 
by students and directed towards teachers in a former Soviet country. Authors have found 
out that informal payments are “not necessarily systematic” although they do occur 
frequently (p.492). Moreover, their research respondents have placed a high value on 
“help[ing] one other” and “gain[ing] access to services to information” (p.491), thus 
rationalizing the practice on the one hand, but they were not particularly proud of informal 
payments as the means to achieve the objectives on the other. Darden (2008) discusses the 
role of corruption, such as bribery and embezzlement, with an intriguing twist. While these 
informal practices tend to be linked with private practices within ineffective states as burdens 
almost intuitively, the author argues it is possible for informal practices to be institutionalized 
and effectively reinforce formal state functions (p.36). This provides an alternative 
perspective to the traditional argument over the relationship between formal and informal 
institutions; if one switches the analytical lenses to view the state “as a form or organized 
domination that is not necessarily based on law, it becomes clear that bribery and other 
corrupt practices can provide the basis for robust states of a different type” (Ibid., p.54). 
communicated, and enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels” (Ibid).  
With the variations above in mind, Helmke and Levitsky (2004) identify and classify 
the four types of informal institutions by whether the informal institutions strive for 
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converging or diverging from the intended outcome of formal institutions and perceived 
effectiveness or ineffectiveness of formal institutions. ‘Complementary’ informal institutions 
“[address] contingencies not dealt with in the formal rules” or “[pursue] individual goals 
within the formal institutional framework” (p.728). ‘Accommodating’ informal institutions 
“create incentives to behave in ways that alter the substantive effects of formal rules, but 
without directly violating them” (p.729). This type of informal institutions, for instance 
“reconcile” the diverging interests among the involved actors (Ibid.). Competing informal 
institutions, on the contrary, emerge when actors disregard or breach formal rules and 
protocols purposefully (Ibid.). This includes, for instance, adherence to custom law at 
expense of state law. Lastly, “substitutive informal institutions rise in situations where 
formal, or more precisely, state institutions and their authority are lacking and ineffective, 
characterized by gentleman’s agreements or self-defense patrols to ensure safety of the 
community: “Hence, substitutive informal institutions achieve what formal institutions were 
designed, but failed, to achieve” (Ibid).  However, there is a room for more variations to 
interpreting what institutions can be. Schmidt (2008) discusses in her elaborative theorization 
of ‘discursive institutionalism’ that actors, or agents, the ideas they hold and the discourses, 
a ‘dynamic’ process in which those ideas are exchanged, negotiated, and agreed, can impact 
the formal institutions.  
The definition of accountability varies from scholar to scholar, yet they seem to agree 
on accountability as a regulatory, restrictive concept with a various degree. For instance, it is 
described as a “social relationship”, in which an actor feels “obligation to explain and to 
justify his or her conduct to some significant other” (Bovens, 2007b p.184). In this light, 
Macdonald (2014) refers to accountability as “moral or institutional relation” (p.428) in 
which “one agent (or group of agents) is accorded entitlements to question, direct, sanction 
or constrain the actions of another – particularly where these actions involve the exercise of 
public power or authority within a governance system” (Ibid.). The definitions further 
diversify into adherence to normative standards (Bovens, 2010, p.947), a “legal obligation” 
(Considine, 2002, p.22), the processes for the involved individuals and organizations to 
“answer for their actions and consequences” (Deloffre, 2016, p.726). Romzek (2000) applies 
the term “answerability” (p.22) for one’s performance instead of an obligation. However, the 
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underlying connotation of ‘arrangements’ penetrates through them. A number of other 
scholars pair the term ‘accountability’ with ‘mechanisms’ (Koenig-Archibugi, 2010), 
‘relationships’ (Koenig-Archibugi, 2004; Olsen 2015), and ‘chains’ (Mason, 2008) as well. 
In this light, Boström and Garsten (2008), point out that accountability can be ensured by 
organizational arrangements, which are not only implemented in the form of tangible, formal 
mechanisms, such as benchmarking, evaluation protocol, implementation of code of conduct, 
or auditing on the one hand, but also in the form of ‘softer’, informal managing efforts, 
including voluntary regulations, standards, or even blaming and shaming, on the other. 
Likewise, Romzek (2014) understands informal accountability as one “outside the realm of 
formal agreements and official reporting relationships” (p.814). In the meantime, however, 
it is equally important to posit whether there may be an alternative category to accountability, 
especially considering the impact of actors in institutions as Schmidt above describes.   
There is also a range of forms of accountability. First, similar to governance, 
accountability can be classified into vertical and horizontal dimensions. Vertical 
accountability is characterized by a hierarchical principal-agent relationship, which is “based 
on close supervision of individuals who have low work autonomy and face internal controls” 
(Romzek, 2000, p.23). The horizontal arrangement, in contrast, introduces the concept of 
“accountability to administrative forums, to citizens, clients, and civil society” (Bovens, 
2007a, p.110). In addition, Keohane (2006) presents internal and external accountability. In 
internal accountability, actors “depend on those who created them for financial support, 
legitimacy or other resources” (p.79). In external accountability, in contrast, actors, either 
individuals or organizations, are “held accountable not to those who delegated power to them, 
but to those affected by their action” (Ibid.).  
Lastly, scholars often form their inquiry into the questions of accountability to what 
(for what), to whom, and by what means (i.e. Macdonald, 2014; Schmitz et al., 2012; 
Romzek, 2000). For instance, Schmitz et al. (2012) in their study on NGO accountability, 
organize their empirical findings around the description of “on what” leadership views 
accountability, “to whom NGO leaders feel they are accountable to”, and “how they 
implement accountability in their organization” (p.1177). Macdonald (2014) investigates the 
meanings of accountability in “relation to what” (p.428), “to whom” (p.429), and “through 
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what means” (p.430) and focuses on the subject matter, stakeholders, and institutional means 
that are arranged, which may, for instance, take form of ‘hierarchical’, ‘legal’, ‘market’, 
‘peer’, as well as ‘public reputational’ mechanisms (Ibid.). Table 1-1 summarizes the aspects 
of accountability discussed above, which will be relevant to this project. To briefly 
summarize and build a broader point of view, this project places accountability as an 
institutional arrangement, which situates itself a given governance arena. Within the 
institutional arrangement, there is a sense of obligation or answerability to one’s own 
conduct. Such obligation may be observed at a formal and informal realm, and there are 
various dimensions to which such obligation may be assigned. To further investigate 
accountability in specific cases, it will be valuable to formulate the investigation on 
accountability to what, to whom, and by what means.  
 
Table 1-1. A summary of components of accountability relevant to this project. 
What it is Of what To what 
In what 
realms 
In what 
dimensions 
Guiding 
questions 
Institutional 
arrangements 
 
Obligation to 
explain 
Answerability 
One's own 
conduct and 
performance 
(Individuals or 
organizations) 
Formal 
Informal 
Vertical 
Horizontal 
Internal 
External 
To (for) what 
To whom 
By what means 
(i.e. 
hierarchical) 
 
3. Entering transnational arena and what it means to the concept 
When a concept crosses territorial border, by cross-border movement of people, 
commodities, as well as issues for instance, it generates a new arena for non-state actors and 
weakens the traditional state-based hierarchical governance as well as accountability 
structure. Dingwerth and Pattberg (2006) define transnationality as an interaction between 
states and non-state actors across borders, while ‘global’ implies a unified whole that consists 
of various policy levels (p.196). In other words, there may be many instances of transnational 
governance in a specific policy field, but there should only one global governance 
arrangement for the whole policy field. It is equally important that transnationality does not 
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mean the absence of nation states. That being said, Waylen (2004) states that when 
governance crosses national jurisdictions, it pertains not only to the “co-ordination and 
control mechanisms” of a collective entity, but also to “the regulatory norms, discourses and 
practices that help to establish the terms and meaning of policies” (p.558). Transnationality 
is likely to yields more influence to non-state governance actors, both individuals and 
organizations. Transnational actors, such as international organizations, including non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), transnational corporations (TNCs), and 
intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), operate across boundary and increase their presence 
in governance beyond the traditional system of national borders. In addition, scholars such 
as Bexell et al. (2010) stress the relevance of civil society actors as an emerging transnational 
agent, including but not limited to advocacy networks, social movements, and philanthropic 
foundations.  
In terms of accountability, transnationality blurs or complicates the relationship of 
‘accouters’ and ‘accountees’ of the traditional principal-agent structure, which could lead to 
new accountability gaps. Koenig-Archibugi (2010) emphasizes several crucial differences 
between (domestic) accountability and transnational accountability. For instance, when 
viewed transnationally, accountability relationships are “often parts of larger chains of 
accountability” by which intermediaries and proxies connect “ultimate accountability-
holders” to “ultimate accountability-providers” (Ibid., p.1150). Furthermore, the non-binding 
‘soft law’ (social accountability) tends to prevail over ‘hard law’ (legal accountability) 
(Ibid.). In a more recent work, Koenig-Archibugi and Macdonald (2013) provide a further 
systematic analysis of transnational accountability by intermediaries in the context of non-
state governance arrangement, where governance can be provided without involving the state 
actors. In this work, the authors introduce “surrogate accountability” or “accountability by 
proxy” (p.500): accountability arrangements, in which “actors exercise accountability on 
behalf of other actors and is not itself accountable to them” (Ibid.). This dimension of 
accountability arrangements is placed as an opposite of what they refer to as “beneficiary 
accountability” (Ibid), by which “policymakers are held directly accountable to those most 
affected by their decisions” (Ibid.). However, these distinctions of transnational 
accountability may only begin to manifest themselves at an ‘operational level’ of analysis as 
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opposed to a conceptual level, where, norms, actors, and institutions that are involved in a 
specific accountability relationship remain abstract without sufficient details (Macdonald, 
2014, p.428). 
Provided that the principal-agent structure at a transnational level is rather unclear at 
the transnational level, the existence literature raises concern for accountability gap, which 
obscures the three focal points of accountability to what, to whom, and by what mean. 
Accountability gap is frequently associated with public accountability, which as Bovens 
(2007) stresses, is the “hallmark of modern democratic governance”, in which those in power 
is held accountable by the public for their acts and decisions that affect public management 
(p.182). This form of accountability and the gap can be applied to state actors as well as non-
state and private actors. In this light, accountability gap, for instance, refers to collusive 
behavior between government officials and members of a TNC (Koenig-Archibugi, 2004, 
p.239), or “gap between demands and responses” (Koenig-Archibugi, 2010, p.1151). 
Accountability gap manifests itself in several other forms as well, all of which obscures the 
three focal points in accountability to what, to whom, and by what means. Nelson and Cottrell 
(2016) illuminate the paradoxical context in which the organizations function by example of 
the International Olympic Committee; while it stands as the symbol and champion of 
universalism utilizing the transcending appeals of sports, its day-to-day operation is 
characterized by political, profit-driven, and self-serving motives. Such claim questions the 
subject matter of the existing accountability structure (to what). Moreover, there is a wealth 
of literature on democratic deficit in the EU (i.e. Curtin et al., 2010; Follesdal & Hix, 2006; 
Katz, 2001; König, 2007). This would be a case where the question of to ‘whom’ 
(beneficiaries of the specific accountability) blurs. Likewise, scholars also point out the 
discrepancy between rhetoric and implementation of transnational actors. Barnett (2016), for 
instance, maintains that governance institutions that operate at the global level with a robust 
accountability mechanism are “much better at preaching accountability than living it” and an 
excess of accountability can hamper the organization’s ability to serve public interest (p.134). 
These criticisms illuminate the vagueness of institutional means, by which accountability is 
ensured transnationally.   
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Chapter 2. Contextualizing the Concept 
The previous chapter briefly discussed the concept as well as the setting of accountability 
and the implications of situating the concept transnationally. It delineated some of the 
existing definitions, types/forms, as well as the realms of the concept, and added what 
differences transnationality yields to the concept, including the emergence of intermediaries 
or proxies and inclination toward softer, non-legally binding means to maintain 
accountability structure. This chapter introduces transnational municipal networks (TMNs) 
as a new forum and actor of accountability, thus transnational accountability, in an effort to 
contextualize the conceptual framework. It will delineate what TMNs are, how they operate, 
and what mechanisms can be found, all of which will feed into the final section outlining the 
gap in current academic literature for further research. 
 
1.  How to define Transnational Municipal Networks 
While the state governments and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) have long 
been construed as the predominant actors in the negotiation and decision-making process at 
the global and transnational level, emerging issues and challenges necessitated emerging 
actors. In recent years, a burgeoning amount of political demands has introduced the network 
of cities beyond and across national borders, named transnational municipal networks 
(TMNs) or transnational city networks (TCNs). Many consist of 1) a secretariat and 
‘coordinators’, 2) presidency, board, and general assembly, and 3) member cities (Kern & 
Bulkeley, 2009, p.314). Some, such as C40, boast a world-wide membership, while a number 
of others, including Union of Baltic Cities, operate at a regional and transnational level. There 
are also state-based organizations as characterized by National Leagues of Cities in the US. 
According to Acuto and Rayner (2016), 29% of the 170 TMNs that they have studied cover 
environment-related issues as their primary focus, followed by poverty or inequality (16%) 
and energy (12%) (p.1154). The existing body of research has investigated how TMNs 
operate and function from a range of aspects including, but not limited to, the organizational 
features to better understand how to define the networks and what they entail. 
Scholars view TMNs quite differently when conceptualizing them. Kern and 
Bulkeley (2009) posit TMNs as agents of Europeanization in the multi-level governance 
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setting, whereby Europeanization is construed as the means of accomplishing multi-level 
governance (p.312). Europeanization, according to the authors, has become increasingly a 
two-way process between the EU institutions and local authorities. Earlier, Europeanization 
referred to the process by which the decisions made at the EU-level would impact the local 
authorities. Today, it also encompasses a phenomenon where local authorities influence these 
decisions directly (p.312). With that being said, it is argued that establishing and developing 
TMNs in Europe accelerates and enhances the process of Europeanization (Ibid.). Dai (2003) 
shares the sentiment and states that there is a kind of “symbiotic relationship” between the 
EU institutions, in particular the European Commission and not just with TMNs but also 
transnational policy networks, and they “reinforce each other’s position as policy actors 
within the EU power structure” (p.197). Acuto and Rayner (2016) demonstrate TMNs as a 
diplomatic entity as they “constitute mediated ‘international’ relations between rightful 
representatives of polities (cities in this instance)” (p.1148) and “result in agreements, 
collaborations, further institution-building and cooperation across boundaries” (Ibid.). Betsill 
and Bulkeley (2004) introduce the notion of TMNs as a ‘transnational advocacy network’, 
which consists of both state and non-state actors that “operate simultaneously within 
domestic and international political arenas” in order to seek support internationally (p.474). 
 
2 How Transnational Networks work 
 Existing literature also discusses the means and instruments that TMNs employ in 
order to achieve their objectives. Busch et al. (2018) introduce five processes that TMNs 
specialize in regarding climate change: 1) Enabling internal mobilization, 2) formulating 
emission reduction goals, 3) institutionalizing climate trajectories, 4) enabling direct 
exchange, and 5) offering project support. More specifically, these networks attempt to solve 
climate governance at the municipality level by raising awareness among the local policy-
makers and residents (p.225). Moreover, networks assist municipalities not only to set their 
CO2 reduction goal but also embed the necessary climate change policies into the local 
framework (p.226). TMNs also stimulate direct exchange of ideas between municipalities by 
organizing cooperation beyond borders or regular conferences, which can boost motivation 
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among member cities (p.226). Lastly, TMNs provide support for member cities to implement 
tangible programs to ensure tangible results within the communities (Ibid.). 
Similarly, Kern and Bulkeley (2009) discuss the operation of TMNs in terms of their 
internal and external ‘governing’. Internally, TMNs create ‘best’ practices and later share 
them with member cities (p.320). Moreover, the networks also fund, often jointly with 
external organizations such as the EU, and facilitate transnational projects (p.321).  In the 
EU context, the European Commission has successfully increased its influence on TMNs by 
providing funding for their projects, thus inducing the process of top-down Europeanization 
(p.324), and that funding has become a crucial determining aspect of daily operations of the 
TMNs they have examined (Ibid.). In the realm of climate change governance, a system of 
“recognition, benchmarking, and certification” is incorporated as more of an “interventionist 
approach” (p.322). Externally, TMNs strive for influencing intergovernmental organizations, 
for instance, by earning observer status (p.323) and by cooperating with and competing 
against other transnational networks (p.324). The outcome of these efforts largely hinges on 
the “nature of the intermediation” between a TMN and a broader policy-making realm of a 
specific policy field the network is interested in (p.326).  Hakelberg (2014) captures the core 
essence of the arrangement as follows: “strategies deployed by TMNs to steer their members 
towards adoption are strategies for ‘governance by diffusion’” by which certain policies will 
further disperse (p.110). Last but not least, there is another unappreciated aspect in the 
landscape of TMNs that is worth shedding light onto in addition to the means of information 
sharing and dissemination, and learning from best practices as the driving mechanism: 
creating a social fabric. Betsill and Bulkeley (2004) point out that the level of engagement 
and mobilization toward ‘financial’ and ‘political’ resources that the member cities have 
exhibited in the studied network “held together through the creation of financial, political, 
and discursive ‘glue,’ and that the exchange of information and other material resources is a 
means through which such connections are secured rather than being an end in itself” (p.490). 
 
3 Possible mechanism(s) of governance for TMNs 
Examining accountability structure will lead this project to observe an essence of 
network governance, one of the most recent governance trends, within which accountability 
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situates itself. As Drezner (2015) elucidates in a concise manner, arrangements of a network 
are determined by “the extent to which actors (also called nodes in the argot of network 
analysis) exploit their relationships with other actors (called ties)” (p.87). From the 
governance perspective, network arrangements comprise of how actors use institutions and 
structures of authority, and collaborate for the purpose of allocating resources and 
coordinating joint actions (Provan & Kenis, 2008, p.231). Klijin (2008) suggests the 
following three types of analysis on networks. First, actors should be construed as the “basic 
units of analysis” (p.137) as the original sources of actions. It is the perceptions that actors 
hold that “inform and inspire the choice of strategies” (Ibid.). Second, the decision-making 
process as well as its acceleration and stagnation behind policy outcome and implementation 
deserves attention (Ibid.), as it reflects an intricate interaction of the relevant actors. Third, 
the characteristics of the network itself is critical as well (Ibid., p.138). One possible 
approach, according to the author, would be to map the patterns of interactions, in which a 
researcher identifies the “central” and “peripheral” actors as well as who is connected to 
whom (Ibid.). However, mapping by itself would not reveal the rules, especially the informal 
ones, that guide the behavior no matter how complex the diagram may be (Ibid.), which 
should not be neglected when studying a network. Additionally, in case of TMNs, 
transnationality is likely to alter, more or less, the nature of the network arrangement as well; 
it may solidify the ties of the actors, enabling a seamless transition of jurisdictions between 
actors driven by a shared vision, or undermine the network, producing merely an 
amalgamation of sporadically located entities without an autonomy to execute joint 
implementations. Likewise, jurisdictional contestation against national governments and 
domestic legislative system may hamper the actions networks intend to implement. Lastly, 
the ultimate outcome of network governance may not be a policy in a transnational setting if 
the network consists of non-state actors across borders.  
 
4. The research gap between the actor and concept 
So far, this chapter has discussed what TMNs are as well as what their functions entail 
in order to successfully achieve their goals. Despite the potential of TMNs, the existing 
literature lacks the width as well as the depth, exposing multiple shortcomings. First, the 
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ongoing study as well as the portfolio of the existing networks almost disproportionately 
center around climate change, and the roles of TMNs in the realm of migration governance 
at the global and transnational level are under-researched. In this regard, while there is 
research linking domestic city-networks and accountability (Holemen, 2011), one on 
transnational networks is lacking. A number of TMNs, including the prominent ones, such 
as C40 and the Global Covenant of Mayors for Climate & Energy, were in fact founded for 
the purpose of tackling climate change and advocating sustainable urban development. 
Secondly, the existing literature on TMNs center around the formal and quantifiable features 
in the way they are organized. Quite a few works mentioned earlier, such as Bouteligier 
(2013) and Bansard et al. (2017), approach a specific conceptual phenomenon through the 
visible, institutional structure of TMNs, including but not limited to the distribution of 
membership, official targets, and protocols. Others, such as Rashidi and Patt (2018), analyze 
a dataset that covers 127 cities around the world and provide statistical evaluation. In other 
words, there is a considerable room left for an in-depth qualitative analysis to step into the 
informal institutions that govern TMNs. By focusing its research on the migration crisis of 
2015/2016, this thesis will contribute in filling this specific research gap in the following 
chapters and provide insights on TMNs in policy fields other than climate change and the 
formal structure by which they operate. 
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Chapter 3. Migration Crisis  
The previous chapter discussed transnational municipal networks (TMNs) as an actor to 
contextualize the concept of transnational accountability. This chapter introduces the final 
piece of the conceptual phenomenon, the 2015/2016 EU migration crisis. This research 
chooses to specify the timeframe of the crisis as 2015 to 2016 although it is an ongoing 
phenomenon, following the trend in the existing academic literature (i.e. Chtouris & Miller, 
2017; Niemann & Zaun, 2018; Wolf & Ossewaarde, 2018). It also intends to refer to the 
phenomenon as migration crisis as opposed to refugee crisis in order to include forcefully 
displaced people, refugees, and asylum-seekers as widely as possible. This chapter first 
introduces some of the challenges of migration governance followed by a section that 
elaborates the relevance of the 2015/2016 migration crisis to the conceptual framework of 
transnational accountability as well as to transnational municipal networks (TMNs). 
 
1. Migration as a policy field 
 Migration has been construed as a challenging field to establish one comprehensive 
governance framework, both at the global and transnational level. There have been initiatives, 
for instance in tackling cross-border displacement due to natural disasters, but they laid bare 
the complexities of steering through national sovereignty, the simultaneous flows of internal 
and external displacement, and the fundamental causes of the displacement, as international 
organizations struggled to weave an effective plan through them all (Betts, 2015, p.72).  
 Quite a few works in the existing body of literature problematize how the notion of 
migration and migrants have been constructed and how it further impacts the way relevant 
policy is drafted. Scholars point out that there is a “fear of numbers” (Anderson, 2017, 
p.1530; Oelgemöller, 2011, p.412). The concept as well as the phenomenon of migration, 
according to Anderson (2017), indicate a ‘problematic’ mobility while not all mobility 
receives the level of scrutiny equivalent to migration, and migration “signals the need for 
control” (p.1532). The author stresses that ‘migrant’ and ‘migration’ are a product of policy 
and public discourse, and a deeper issue lies in the fact that ‘migration’ is detached from 
other areas of policy (p.1535). Narrowing down the notion of migration, Esses et al. (2017). 
lays out how ‘refugees’ shape certain trends in public attitude. According to the authors, the 
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public tend to perceive them as a threat and competition, which is further bolstered by a sense 
of attachment to national identity and ingroups, both intricately aligned with ethnic identity 
(p.87). These tendencies ultimately lead to dehumanization of refugees. Thus, as one way to 
alleviate such an attitude toward refugees, the authors urge policy makers to carefully draft 
their message that pertain to refugees and their resettlement, and “avoid rationalizing policies 
on the basis of preventing threat” (p.104). 
Scholars also raises concerns for the roles of nation states in migration governance. 
Castles (2004) points out that migration policy almost always ‘fails’ to fulfil its intended 
objectives due to the underlying presumptions that do not capture the reality. These include, 
for instance, include the paradoxical duality between a state-based logic of ‘migration 
control’ and transnational mobility of migration (p.212). Likewise, a policy cycle tends to be 
short and fitted for electoral terms whereas migration is long-term in its nature (p.213). 
Acknowledging that cross-border migration is typically portrayed as a matter of state 
sovereignty and borders, Geiger and Pécoud (2014) express concern that states and their 
emphasis on ‘sovereign control’ of human mobility may hinder cooperation despite its 
recognized usefulness. Similarly, Faist (2018) applies the phrase “cognitive dissonance” 
(p,416) as he discusses the paradoxes that surround forced migration reflecting on the onset 
of the 2015/2016 crisis; there is a “tension between national concerns and the rule of law” 
(p.414). Namely, national states are conflicted between national, cultural, and security 
concerns and an international obligation to champion human rights (Ibid.). Chimienti (2018) 
further substantiates Faist’s claim by pointing out that “states are still in denial of our 
transnational ‘connectiveness’ in both the worst-case (serious communicable diseases, 
ecological disasters and terrorism) and in the best-case (knowledge transfer, international 
collaboration and agreements) scenarios” and all forms of economic and human mobility are 
only “placed at both extremes, according to the ideological viewpoint” (p.425). While these 
arguments do not explicitly undermine the importance of nation states, the claims do 
demonstrate an inconvenient mismatch of a continuous flow of migration and 
compartmentalized borders. Such state-based conceptualization is also linked with the 
distinction between the country of origin, transit, and destination, which Oelgemöller (2011) 
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calls “arbitrary” (p.420) and individuals falling into the “juridico-political gap” (p. 420) of 
transit countries become invisible and “suspended” of recognition (p.419). 
 
2. Migration crisis and relevance to transnational accountability 
Scholars view the 2015/2016 migration crisis as a contingency that neither the EU 
nor its member states were fully prepared for. It particularly shook the EU’s border regime, 
which includes a common asylum policy and the freedom of movement within the Schengen 
zone. This chapter endeavors to link the crisis to an instance of accountability gap, and, by 
illuminating the discourse surrounding the EU border regime as one of the possible drivers 
of this gap, it will emphasize the necessity of studying an alternative forum/actor outside of 
the conventional state-based premises. 
 
2.1 Migration crisis as an instance of accountability gap 
The 2015/2016 migration crisis particularly shook the EU’s border regime, which 
includes a common asylum policy and the freedom of movement, and left the coastal member 
states almost powerless with an overload of their administrative capacity. While some of the 
member states struggled or failed to comply with the Dublin Regulation and allowed migrants 
and asylum-seekers to travel further without registering, national preferences of the member 
states to support the EU’s proposal split between the ones that were affected by the crisis and 
the ones that were not (Hooghe & Marks, 2019). The affected member states, for instance, 
demanded a reform of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) (Ibid.), whereas the 
non-affected member states preferred the ‘status-quo’ (Ibid., 257). Some point out, however, 
that the EU did offer its best efforts under the given circumstance. Börzel and Risse (2018) 
show that the EU did indeed pass crucial measures that ranged from securing funds for 
purposes ranging from managing the flow of refugees, establishing a list of ‘safe countries’ 
of origins, to identifying hotspots in Italy and Greece. Nevertheless, the lack of consensus 
led to an absence of collaborative response to address the influx of refugees effectively. This 
prompted some of the member states to take matters into their own hands by, for example, 
tightening border controls (Börzel & Risse, 2018, p.91). The crisis, thus, negatively impacted 
the Schengen Agreement, one of the quintessential supranational frameworks of the EU. 
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Niemann and Zaun (2018) agrees to this assessment and states that the EU’s response to the 
migration crisis was actually “more comprehensive than commonly perceived” (p.12). In 
other words, the success of its response rather hinged on whether the member states would 
approve and implement the Commission’s proposals (Ibid.). Following the thorough analysis 
of these developments, a number of works (Biermann et al. 2019; Hooghe and Marks 2019; 
Börzel and Risse 2018) discerned stagnation of EU integration, if not disintegration. In this 
light, the essence of the migration crisis was not the inability of the EU institutions to react; 
it was the “growing commitment-compliance gap, which exacerbated the regulator deficits 
of EU governance” (Börzel 2016). The relevant actors, namely the EU and its member states, 
held each other accountable which led to the absence of a cooperative action and a stalemate 
characterized by some of the member states rejecting the relocation-scheme altogether. In 
other words, there was a gap between accountability demands and responses. 
 
3. What the gap entails in the migration crisis 
 A number of scholars turn to the discourse on the EU’s border regime to illuminate 
the potential rationale behind the commitment-compliance gap. The literature suggests at 
least the following three discursive trends: securitization frame to justify border 
militarization, humanitarian frame, and hybrid frame. The section proposes to investigate a 
new potential policy-making venue, TMNs, to examine if and by what means it could 
alleviate the accountability gap.  
 
3.1. Securitization 
The first discursive trends that can be observed in the realm of the EU border regime 
is what scholars refer to as ‘securitization’ of migrants, which legitimizes both national 
governments and the EU institutions to opt for exclusion-oriented measures under the name 
of safety. Williams (2014) defines the notion of securitization of migrants, as well as 
immigrants, as the act of “linking of unauthorized migration with issues of national security” 
(p.28). This, in return, plays a central role in “justifying the militarization of national borders” 
including the incorporation of military technologies, strategies, and in some cases even armed 
personnel, into border enforcement efforts (Ibid.). In other words, the actors successfully 
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establish a migration-security ‘nexus’. Estevens (2018) further delineates the phenomenon 
and elaborates the factors which spark anxiety and escalate the formation of nexus in several 
dimensions. For instance, ‘socioeconomic’ concern, such as unemployment, the proliferation 
of informal economy, the stagnation of welfare states, and the deterioration of the urban 
environment, induces negativity toward migrants (p.4). Similarly, the ‘securitarian’ 
dimension demonstrates the concern that grows in the issue areas that includes state 
sovereignty, borders, and security as a result of viewing migrants as a threat (Ibid.). 
‘Identarian’ is a dimension that reflects domestic anxiety toward potential disturbance in 
local cultural heritage and demography due to the inflow of migrants. Lastly, the ‘political’ 
dimension absorbs the other three trends and supports the formulation of xenophobic 
discourses (Ibid.). The author confirms a growing presence of the securitizing trend in the 
EU and raises three potential repercussions: interference with the European Union’s 
fundamental values of equality and protection of human rights, interruption of the 
development of necessary integration mechanisms, and overgeneralization of migrants into 
a single category (Ibid., p.12). Securitization is, thus, a manifestation of a “transformation of 
epistemology” regarding security from “something out there” into a phenomenon that 
requires an analysis of the “process by which actors construct issues as threats to security” 
(Karyotis, 2007, p.2-3). 
Existing scholarly work recognizes that the securitization discourse has grown in 
multiple member states over the years. Vezovnik (2018), for instance, reports the process of 
constructing migrants and migration as a threat in Slovenia, one of the countries that stood 
along what has become known as the West Balkan Route. After the influx and transit of 
refugees became a visible issue in September 2015, the rhetoric that framed them as a ‘risk’ 
appeared, first by depicting migrating asylum-seekers as ‘unpredictable’ and gradually 
associating them with public health concern, violence, or simply an inconceivable ‘mass’ of 
‘others’ (p.46). The author concludes that the rhetorical tactics applied in securitizing 
migration strikingly resembled the language applied in the military domain, including the 
emphasis on fighting, defending, protecting, as well as on controlling and surveilling (Ibid., 
p.51). In a similar manner, Krzyżanowska and Krzyżanowski (2018) illustrate the 
securitizing trend in Poland. They claim that the linkage between the crisis and migration has 
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intensified to a degree where the relatively neutral expression of the migrants (kryzys 
migracyjny) and a more negative expression (kryzys migrancki) were applied almost 
interchangeably in public discourse, including conservative media outlets (Ibid., p.616). The 
authors emphasize the significance of such merges of the qualitatively different expressions; 
“it allows negative meanings and connotations to be widely accepted or ‘normalized’” and 
these meanings could ultimately impact the public understanding of pluralism and diversity 
(Ibid.). Ibrahim and Howarth (2018) argue that the shift in the construct of risk around 
migrants pre- and post-crisis occurred when the portrayals of migrants and refugees shifted 
from individual to collective reflecting the sheer number of them pressuring the internal as 
well as external borders of the EU (p.1475). Overall, securitization rhetoric emphasizes 
exclusion instead of inclusion, and control as opposed to care.  
 
3.2. Counter-perspective to securitization 
The second discursive trend in the EU’s border regime underlines the necessity of a 
humanitarian approach. Triandafyllidou (2018) names it as a “moralizing frame” (p.211) and 
as one of the dominant interpretive lenses that is opposite of the securitization lenses to view 
the crisis and the pressing situation at the EU’s internal and external borders. A moralizing 
frame “puts the responsibility of the flows on wars, conflict, and violence in the regions of 
origin” (Ibid.). In other words, people migrating are construed as victims and are “represented 
as almost deprived of agency” (Ibid.). Consequently, the European values and ideas are 
deeply embedded not only as strategies but also as the fundamental premises. The way Italy’s 
prime minister bolstered his remarks with ‘Christian solidarity’ supports this claim (Ibid.). A 
humanitarian border regime focuses on protection instead of control, and its advocates view 
it as a moral duty to respond to the crisis. For authors such as Panebianco and Fontana (2018), 
it means recognizing refugees and asylum seekers as beneficiaries of Responsibility to 
Protect (R2P) and asylum as a tool for R2P. In this light, potential measures to navigate the 
crisis include quota systems, provision of temporary protection, and respecting relocation 
preferences of refugees (Ibid., p.11). The authors argue that if member states fail to protect 
their populace, which should not exclude non-nationals, or become the perpetrator of crimes, 
“the international community should adopt appropriate measures, either peaceful (e.g. 
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diplomatic means, humanitarian aids, targeted sanctions) or non-peaceful, including the use 
of collective force mandated by the [United Nations Security Council]” (Ibid., p.3). 
Furthermore, a humanitarian approach not only means inclusion and care but also, ultimately, 
assisting the migrants to reach Europe. Cuttitta (2018) articulates his standpoint that 
humanitarianism can enhance the development of policies aimed at strengthening search and 
rescue operations and establishing a robust relocation mechanism. The author elaborates that 
admission of migrants and asylum seekers to the EU, including people ‘at risk’ of death, 
currently relies greatly on the arbitrary aspects, such as fate. They remain subject to irregular 
circumstances and deportation (Ibid., p.784). 
         While the humanitarian approach promotes a discourse of inclusion, acceptance, and 
migration-centered approach, the usage of the humanitarian discourse can easily be twisted. 
Triandafyllidou (2018) adds that the moralizing frame can become a useful tool for the EU 
skeptics or members states that resist or refrain from cooperation toward a comprehensive 
EU solution. The author points out that Croatia and Serbia, for instance, have turned the 
argument and utilized the notion of humanitarianism, or rather the absence thereof, as the 
‘European’ problem and not theirs (Ibid., p.211-212). Likewise, Cuttitta (2018) points to the 
potential hijacking of humanitarian discourse. Border authorities can tighten their control and 
establish policies that ultimately prevent migrants from embarking on their journey, all under 
the pretense of humanitarian protection (Ibid., p.784). Pallister-Wilkins (2015) underline that 
humanitarianism and policing are not mutually exclusive; instead, they are interdependent on 
one another (p.65). If these views had prevailed after the onset of the 2015/2016 crisis, the 
gap between member states, as well as member states and the EU may not have existed.  
 
3.3 Hybrid perspective 
When one looks at the EU level, the duality of humanitarianism seems even more 
prevalent and deeply rooted in the theoretical basis of its evolving border regime. Davitti 
(2018), for instance, argues that the EU has utilized the shockingly high number of deaths in 
the Mediterranean as an opportunity to “frame recent migration flows as an emergency that, 
by definition, can only be addressed through the adoption of exceptional measures” (p.1173). 
Moreno-Lax (2018) classifies this general trend into two subtypes: the ‘rescue-through-
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interdiction model’ and ‘rescue-without-protection’ model. The former refers to the 
circumstances in which migrants and asylum-seekers are not allowed to reach the EU under 
the name of human rights protection. The latter refers to the operations of rescuing, or 
intercepting at times, of migrants and asylum-seekers facing smuggling or human trafficking. 
In these situations, border guard officers are confronted with the dilemma whether they 
should protect their own lives first or those of migrants and asylum-seekers (Ibid., p.131). In 
a similar oxymoronic manner, Vollmer (2016) applies the ‘hypocritical’ term ‘humane 
refoulement’ to describe the current border regime, where the treatment may be humane, but 
the outcome is de facto exclusion and/or expulsion (p.733). While the first two discursive 
frames represent competing depictions of the crisis and are often prone to certain features, 
such as left/right identification of the political leadership, as well as media outlets, and 
whether the country is a point of arrival, transit, or destination for migrants, the third frame 
is a way of “reconciliation through the form of rationalization” when attempting to recognize 
what the crisis is essentially about (Triandafyllidou, 2018, p.:213). 
         The 2015 European Agenda on Migration (European Commission) seems to capture 
the essence of reconciling the two discourses. First, it sets the tone of humanitarianism: “[t]he 
immediate imperative is the duty to protect those in need. The plight of thousands of migrants 
putting their lives in peril to cross the Mediterranean has shocked us all” (European 
Commission, 2015, p.2). Next, it links the protection with the necessity to intersect criminal 
and smuggling networks and heightened control and policing measures: 
  
The criminal networks which exploit vulnerable migrants must be targeted. The High 
Representative/Vice President (HR/VP) has already presented options for possible 
Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) operations to systematically identify, 
capture, and destroy vessels used by smugglers. (Ibid., p.3) 
  
The ‘rescue-through-interdiction model’ is also observable as an effort to “intervene 
upstream in regions of origin and of transit” in order to provide assistance to those in need 
(Ibid., p.5): 
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[...] a pilot multi-purpose center will be set up in Niger by the end of the year. 
Working with the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the UNHCR and 
the Niger authorities, the center will combine the provision of information, local 
protection and resettlement opportunities for those in need. Such centers in countries 
of origin or transit will help to provide a realistic picture of the likely success of 
migrants’ journey and offer assisted voluntary return options for irregular migrants. 
(Ibid.) 
  
In this approach, migrants and asylum-seekers will not arrive on the European soil even 
though it may be their will. Likewise, ‘humane refoulement’ is relatively visible in the 
document as well as it encourages a safe return to the country of their departure to deter 
irregular migration altogether: 
  
The EU will help third countries to meet their obligations by offering support such as 
capacity building for management of returns, information and awareness campaigns, 
and support for reintegration measures. The Commission will also revise its 
approach to readmission agreements, prioritizing the main countries of origin of 
irregular migrants. (Ibid., p.10) 
  
In order to realize this plan, the Commission need to ensure that member states comply with 
relevant directives and install a more expeditious structure that will “allow Europe to ensure 
a humane and dignified treatment of returnees and proportionate use of coercive measures, 
in line with fundamental rights and the principle of non-refoulement” (Ibid.). While Maricut 
(2017) points out that the institutional responses to the 2015/2016 crisis were only an 
“upgrading of the security narrative of the Council” (p.171), the document demonstrates 
more; the Commission’s awareness of the circumstances under which it needed to 
successfully advocate the agenda. This third frame shows that EU acted as a conscious 
intermediary connecting the two opposing discursive trends weaving them into a policy.  
 
4. Research Outlook 
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 Table 3-1. below summarizes what has been discussed in this section so far as a realm 
illustrative of the accountability gap which was discussed in the previous section. According 
to the existing literature, some member states pursued the option to securitize migration and 
tighten border control while others as well as scholars appealed to a more humanitarian 
approach to perceive migration and border management, thus demonstrating a different 
prioritization on accountability. The EU appeared to incorporate both of the two contrasting 
discursive trends and constituted a rather oxymoronic concept of ‘control in order to care’. 
These perspectives are not necessarily in tune or aligned with one another, and what drives 
the wedge, as scholars above pointed out, revolves around ideology and national identity. 
This discrepancy, however, should also prompt investigation of other levels of analysis and 
explore whether and how the landscape changes. TMNs, for instance, provides an intriguing 
mix of characteristics. While the network as a whole connects municipalities across 
geographical borders, each member city is subject to domestic legal systems. In the 
meantime, cities are often described as the ‘frontier’ (Oomen & Baumgärtel, 2018) or the 
‘center’ (Sassen, 2009) of specific policy-related issues. Would TMNs prove themselves to 
be viable problem-solving forum and fill the accountability gap, and if so, in what way? 
 
Table 3-1. Three discursive trends, their level of analysis and themes. 
Discourses Securitization Humanitarianism Rationalization 
Level of 
analysis 
Member states 
Member states (and 
academic community) 
The EU 
Priority Internal accountability External Accountability 
Internal and External 
accountability 
Themes 
National security 
Threat to society 
Us and them 
Control 
Exclusion 
Moral issue 
Care 
Human rights 
Inclusion and acceptance 
European value' 
Tighter control to protect 
human rights 
Rescue-through- 
interdiction 
Rescue-without-protection 
Humane refoulement 
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Chapter 4. Research design 
The previous chapter introduced the 2015/2016 EU migration crisis as the final piece to 
complete the conceptual framework as well as the context of this research focusing on 
transnationality. It stressed the complexity of migration, which is almost inevitably 
transnational, as a policy and governance field as it has long been construed as within state 
jurisdiction. Next, it shed light onto the existing scholarly analysis on the 2015/2015 EU 
migration crisis and introduced a perspective, which viewed it as an instance of 
accountability gap. Lastly, it endeavored to illuminate a potential driver of the gap, the 
discourse that has surrounded the EU’s border regime in an effort to indicate the possibility 
of investigating alternative venues and/or actors. This chapter will build on this elaborated 
framework to incorporate accountability, TMNs, and the migration crisis into a coherent 
research design to examine the dynamics of transnational accountability in greater depth and 
detail. 
  
1. Research Questions 
This research explores to establish a nexus between a primary concept, transnational 
accountability, and an emerging forum, transnational municipal networks (TMNs) and 
contextualizes them within the 2015/2016 migration crisis. Furthermore, it aims for 
illuminating the incalculable aspects of transnational accountability in order to fill the gap in 
the existing accountability literature. For these purposes, this study relies on ‘informal 
accountability’. Resting on this concept, the study intends to investigate the following core 
questions: 1) To what do the actors of TMNs hold themselves accountable? 2) To whom do 
the actors of TMNs hold themselves accountable? and 3) By what means do the actors of 
TMNs hold themselves accountable? The first question involves the informal norms and 
standards: “an underlying normative framework that defines the terms on which certain 
behavior can be assessed” (Macdonald, 2014, p.428). The second question focuses on the so-
called ‘stakeholders’ (Ibid., p.430), which are likely to be plural and multilateral, apart from 
what is stated in the official publications. Moreover, the third question refers to the types and 
forms of ‘accountability mechanisms’ (Ibid., p.431), which may not only demonstrate 
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themselves in the visible and tangible forms of reviewing and assessing of processes, 
administrative protocols, as well as the maintenance of public reputation, but also 
internalized in the belief-system of the actors, interpersonal relationships, individual 
perceptions, as well as in the decisions that the actors make. These research questions above 
are intended to explore the lenient patterns in the meanings of the network as well as the 
conflicts between the expected and actual ownership of accountability. 
 
2. Case selection 
 A set of criteria were applied to select a sample TMN. First, it needed to have the 
refugee crisis as part of its agenda. Although there was a wide array of TMNs, whether 
regional, international, or global, there were only a handful of them that addressed the issues 
of migration and more specifically, the EU migration crisis. In addition, it was essential that 
the selected TMN operates transnationally, so that the study would be able to trace the issue 
as thoroughly as possible as the EU refugee crisis travels across multiple member states from 
points of arrival, through transit, to the destination. UNHCR (2015) reports in its publication 
that there are three main sea routes that refugees traveled: via Greece, Italy, and Spain. In 
addition, Eastern European and the West Balkan states faced an increasing flow of refugees 
as transit countries. Furthermore, due to the scarcity of TMNs that matched these criteria and 
in order to avoid the complexity of the overlapping participation in multiple municipal 
networks per municipality, the sampling needed be done within a single TMN instead of 
comparing two or more networks. Consequently, this project would focus on a single TMN 
case study and identify participants from the member cities and members of the secretariat 
of the network as the ‘actors’ as opposed to treating the entire network as one actor. Lastly, 
the project intended to select a TMN which targeted the EU or European cities consistently, 
including those that are affected by the crisis, as opposed to a global network of cities. 
After conducting a preliminary research on the existing networks, EUROCITIES was 
selected as the sampling network as it fulfilled the criteria mentioned above. EUROCITIES, 
established in 1986, is a network of over 140 cities in Europe. The network and its primary 
objectives are organized into the following six thematic forums: culture, economic 
development, environment, knowledge society, mobility, and social affairs (EUROCITIES). 
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There are multiple working groups within these forums, which are said to be more 
‘technical’, according to one of the interview participants. While its official members are 
‘cities’, mayors as well as practitioners from the local administration both participate in the 
network. The forms of participation could vary from being part of a joint statement, attending 
conferences and meetings, to engaging in initiatives and projects. There is an executive 
committee, which is composed of twelve mayors that are nominated and selected internally, 
and meets at least three times a year (EUROCITIES). Crucial decisions are made at the 
annual general meeting held during the annual convention. EUROCITIES’ secretariat 
functions are assumed by its Brussels office, which assists member cities to advocate their 
policy needs to the EU institutions, publishes reports, releases official statements, and 
coordinates platforms for the member cities to exchange knowledge and expertise.  
 
3. Sampling rationale and method of data collection 
EUROCITIES has been vocal about the migration crisis, in terms of what the EU 
could do to assist cities to overcome the challenges, for instance, by issuing joint statement 
of member cities, publishing reports, and holding a conference with a relevant theme. At the 
end of 2015, EUROCITIES conducted a survey on its member cities and collected responses 
from 34 cities, whose findings were later compiled into the report Refugee Reception and 
Integration in Cities (2016). Refugee Reception and Integration in Cities elaborates what 
types of obstacles the cities faced and what actions they took in response. The report 
illuminates a range of key findings. For instance, cities demonstrated leadership in 
coordinating other local actors, such as civil organizations, and also more “flexibility and 
creativity” than other levels of government (p.6). Moreover, it elucidates how the crisis 
impacted the municipal budget and overwhelmed the available human resources (p.8). In 
terms of local sentiment, the report mentions that several cities have experienced “assault 
and threatening behavior towards refugees and volunteers” as well as “arson attacks and 
vandalism of refugee shelters” (p.10). At the end of the report, EUROCITIES provides a list 
of recommendations to the EU institutions to better assist municipalities in need. In January 
2017, the network also released a separate report, focusing solely on education of refugees 
and asylum seekers, which elucidates how municipalities have incorporated children among 
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refugees and asylum-seekers into the local educational system and ensured their access to 
education by coordinating both vertically and horizontally (EUROCITIES, 2017). On World 
Refugee Day in 2016, members of the EUROCITIES executive committee, which consist 
Mayors of the respective cities, released a joint statement, which was addressed to the head 
of the European Commission, European Parliament, and European Council, to urge the 
European leaders to work with cities and “put [the] European values of solidarity, humanity 
and dignity to the test” (EUROCITIES, 2016). Lastly, EUROCITIES organizes Migration 
and Integration Working Group, in which a wide range of cities from the country of 
destination, transit, and to destination in the flow of displaced individuals during the crisis 
can be found. The group pursues a set of objectives, which include but are not limited to 
socio-economic integration of young migrants and continuation of effort on irregular 
migrants. In the meantime, it engages itself in activities, such as drafting policy guidelines 
and policy statements as well as implementation of relevant projects.  
From the beginning of the project, it has been one of the objectives to include both 
the member cities and members of the secretariat office as participants. Well-established 
international organizations as well as their secretariat bear the potential to become 
intermediary agencies steering stakeholders and managing the discourse of a specific issue 
they are tackling. One such strand has examined the role bureaucracies in international 
organizations play in administering and diffusing policy ideas. Bauer & Ege (2006) compare 
the secretariat of two different intergovernmental treaties: The Ozone Secretariat of the 
Montreal Protocol and the Desertification Secretariat of the United Nations Convention to 
Combat Desertification in Africa (UNCCD). The findings suggest that a secretariat exerts 
most influence on the organization’s governance and agenda when it balances the passive 
and active use of its bureaucratic authority. Nay (2012) claims that secretariats in 
international organizations are more than a responsive and reactive agent. Instead, they are 
likely to skillfully define problems, involve multiple actors across sectional boundaries by 
converging scattered independent projects into one connected framework, and innovate new 
ideas. Thus, today’s bureaucracies and secretariats of international organizations are 
gradually earning the reputation of “knowledge brokers” in transnational governance (Ibid., 
p.60).  
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Through the recruiting process, the 34 member cities listed in the Refugee Reception 
and Integration in Cities (2016) and the secretariat were contacted and received an invitation 
to an interview to speak about their involvement with the network in relation to their tasks 
and challenges of the migration crisis. The invitations were sent between November 2018 
and January 2019 via e-mails. This first group of invitation targeted the participation of 
Mayors. However, the aim was adjusted to municipal practitioners who were actually 
attending the working group meetings in order to improve response. After omitting the 
overlaps from the 34 cities and one municipality whose contact officer was not reachable, 49 
more members cities listed as the member of Migration and Integration Working Group on 
the EUROCITIES’ official website were contacted. Migration and Integration Working 
group was selected as the source of possible participants due to the pertinence of the subject 
matter it handled to that of the project. It was also taken into consideration that those that 
participated the working group on behalf of their municipality would be involved with 
migration-related efforts, if not the migration crisis. EUROCITIES Contact Officers for each 
municipality were the first point of contact, who then established a connection to the 
appropriate personnel who was actually attending events and meetings that were related to 
or organized by the working group. A table of the cities that were contacted, containing the 
date of initial contact and results of correspondence is available in Appendix 1. 
The project managed to collect and interview a total of five individuals, three of which 
were the practitioners at the city administration as illustrated in Table 4-1. One of the staff 
members, who have been involved with migration and integration projects within the 
network, also agreed to participate in an interview after a referral by another potential 
interviewee, who needed to decline invitation herself. Last but not least, one EUROCITIES 
Contact Officer, initially contacted as one of the first points of communication from the list 
of member cities participating in the working group offered to participate in an interview, 
offered to provide insights of the inner mechanism between EUROCITIES’ Brussels office 
and the municipality in his day-to-day work, as the municipality itself was not actively taking 
part in the specific working group or the topic. In fact, those who replied to but declined 
stated similar reasons.  
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Table 4-1. Interview method table. 
Interviewees 
Completion
* 
Source Saturation Format Length Recording Transcript 
Category 1: Local practitioners No     
Interviewee A Jan 30 
Sampling 
frame 
 Skype 60 min Recorded Available 
Interviewee B Feb 1 
Sampling 
frame 
 Skype 60 min Recorded Available 
Interviewee C Feb22 
Sampling 
frame 
 Skype 60 min Recorded Available 
Category 2: Contact officer, staff 
member of the secretariat 
No     
Interviewee D Feb 13 
Sampling 
frame 
 Skype 45 min Recorded Available 
Interviewee E Mar 6 Referral  Skype 60 min Recorded Available 
* All interviews were conducted in 2019 
The project aimed for conducting a semi-structured interview, where participants 
would not be strictly confined into the questions listed in the interview guide, which is 
available in Appendix 2 (addressed to municipalities) and 3 (addressed to the secretariat). 
Instead, they were encouraged to share their stories and narratives even if it might deviate 
slightly from the intended questions. Crouch and McKenzie (2006) discuss the benefits of 
semi-structured, in-depth interview targets “the respondents’ perceptions and feelings rather 
than social conditions surrounding those experiences” (p.485), point out that the “work of 
linking interview accounts -- continually analyzed -- and conceptual frameworks-- under 
construction throughout the research-- clear requires small sample size so that all emerging 
material can be kept in the researcher’s mind as a totality” (p.495.), which, as the authors 
conclude, “is the way in which analytic, inductive, exploratory studies are best done” (p.496). 
Each interview session required between 45 to 60 minutes. All of the five participants 
received an interview guide in advance and signed a consent form. In accordance with the 
terms of the consent form, the details of the participants that may reveal their personal 
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identification and affiliation to a specific municipality shall remain undisclosed in this thesis. 
Interviews were conducted using Skype and were recorded for the purpose of transcribing. 
Before moving on to the method of analysis, it is necessary to elucidate how the 
circumstance in which each interviewee municipality found itself greatly varied. While the 
sample size is small, the project managed to interview practitioners at the municipal level 
from Finland, Italy, and the UK, all of which experienced the crisis differently. A Finnish 
municipality of Interviewee A (Municipality A) encountered an influx of people albeit, as 
the interviewee herself acknowledged, less dire in comparison to other cities such as Munich, 
and the peak has passed. Subsequently, the priorities of their action plan have also shifted. 
An Italian municipality of Interviewee B (Municipality B) began receiving people fleeing 
from Syria prior to the 2015/2016 crisis, and the 2015/2016 crisis triggered another wave of 
urgent situations. The municipality of Interviewee C (Municipality C) presents another 
distinct situation in the UK, where an influx of displaced people did not directly impact the 
city, and it had established a formal structure aimed for integrating not only those who were 
displaced during the 2015/2016 crisis but also migrants in general. Later on, Municipality C 
welcomed a certain number of Syrian refugees as part of a relocation scheme led by the 
national government. Table 4-2 below summarizes these variations. Interviewee D is a 
contact officer from a municipality in Spain, and the staff member from Brussels office will 
be referred to as Interviewee E. All interviewees are alphabetized in the chronological order 
according to the date of the interview.  
 
Table 4-2. Municipalities and their circumstances. 
 Municipality A Municipality B Municipality C 
Country Finland Italy the UK 
During the 2015/2016 
crisis 
Influx of people Influx of people 
Arrival of Syrian 
refugees as part of the 
government's relocation 
scheme 
At the time of the 
interview 
Past the initial urgent 
phase 
Continues to be in an 
urgent phase 
Responsibility of the 
scheme already fulfilled 
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4. Method of analysis 
 Once data were collected, the project then applied inductive qualitative coding. 
Resting on some of the key components of the grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967), the 
project opted out of a set of hypotheses or assumptions based on preconceived 
conceptualization largely due to the fact that the existing literature resonated with the scope  
of the project only partially.2 For instance, there was an abundance of academic research that 
investigated accountability and transnational accountability; however, there was only a scant 
literature on transnational networks of municipalities. Likewise, transnational municipal 
networks have indeed constituted a growing research field, yet only few works discussed 
cross-border migration as the context. In other words, having placed itself at the intersection 
of a specific concept, governance fora, and actual policy issue, the project faced an 
amalgamation of fragmentary findings from the existing body of literature, and the linkage 
was missing. It was, thus, deemed most appropriate to take an inductive approach and aim 
for building a new, ideally overarching, assumption across these domains. After interviews 
were conducted, the content was transcribed, coded, and analyzed utilizing MAXQDA. Table 
4-3 summarizes categories, codes, subcodes, and the respective definitions. Saldana (2013) 
elaborates that a code in qualitative survey captures word or short phrase that “symbolically 
assigns a summative, salient, essence-capturing, and/or evocative attribute for a portion of 
language-based or visual data” (p.3), and constitutes of “a researcher generated construct that 
symbolizes and thus attributes interpreted meanings to each individual datum” in order to 
detect patterns, categorize, and build theories (Ibid., 04). The coding process first focused on 
less abstract, more literal meanings that were observed in the content, and gradually shifted 
towards forming more abstract patterns and themes. The coding scheme is intended to 
demonstrate the findings in terms of how the interviewees comprehended the crisis, what 
expected behavior emerged out of the ways the interviewees relied on and utilized the 
connectedness of the network in the crisis setting, what arrangement governed the operation 
of both the municipalities and the network, and what challenges and obstacles persisted as 
                                               
2  While the grounded theory is overall an intricate method, Hood (2007) points out that one difference between 
the “generic” inductive qualitative model and grounded theory is the “emphasis upon discovery of new theory 
developed from data” made by the latter (p.155).  
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well as how the interviewees made sense of them. Detailed coding scheme with examples 
and frequency of segments are available in the Appendix 4. 
 
Table 4-3. Coding scheme of the project. 
Categories Codes Subcodes Definitions 
What the crisis 
was about 
Emergency 
reception 
-- 
The interviewees directly experienced an 
influx of people 
Planned 
integration 
-- 
The interviewees are in the situation to 
be able to envision in a longer-term of 
integrating refugees 
Expected 
behavior 
Reciprocity 
Sharing and 
learning 
Actors share ideas and learn from each 
other. 
Regional 
difference 
The imbalance in reciprocity of sharing 
and learning among the peers. 
Facilitating 
arrangements 
Coordination 
Robust structure 
Coordination is ensured through a robust 
local structure. 
Endorsement and 
management 
Coordination is ensured through an ad-
hoc endorsement and management of 
local organizations. 
Steering (non-
binding) 
Policy 
frameworks 
Steering is ensured through setting the 
terms of policy frameworks. 
Funded projects 
Steering is ensured through operating 
funded projects. 
Delegation -- 
The secretariat acts and speaks on behalf 
of the member cities towards external 
partners. 
Challenges and 
obstacles 
Jurisdictional 
tension 
National 
legislations and 
decisions 
National legislations decisions are 
creating an interruption at the municipal 
level. 
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Inter- 
governmental 
agreements 
National decisions made at the 
intergovernmental level are creating an 
interruption at the municipal level. 
Organizational 
gaps 
-- 
Internal obstacles that creates 
discontinuity in realizing the goals. 
Inner logic 
Limits of 
competence 
Municipalities recognize the limits in the 
competence of the network. 
Self-evaluation 
Whether the interviewees believe their 
municipality has dealt with the crisis in a 
satisfactory manner. 
Rationalization of 
organizational 
flaws 
How the interviewees make sense of the 
flaws in the network, provided they are 
aware of the limits of the network’s 
competence. 
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Chapter 5. Research findings 
Findings exhibited multiple trends and patterns, gradually leading to the formulation of the 
overall configuration of accountability relationship surrounding and within EUROCITIES in 
the context of the migration crisis. This chapter first introduces the findings in the order of 
the coding scheme as described in Table 4-3 in the previous chapter. Next, it will realign the 
findings in terms of accountability to what, to whom, and by what means in an attempt to 
derive a set of informal themes. The analysis reveals that accountability dynamics shifted 
between the formal and informal level for municipalities as well as the secretariat although 
these shifts did not conflict with the ultimate objectives of addressing the crisis situation. 
However, there is a potential source of conflict in the accountability structure between 
municipalities and the secretariat. 
 
1. What the crisis was about 
As briefly described in the previous sections, the experience of the municipalities, according 
to the interviewees, was roughly divided into two patterns: in or out of the emergency 
situation. In both scenarios, the central component of what made the 2015/2016 migration 
crisis a crisis for those municipalities was the influx of people incessantly arriving on a daily 
basis, thus shaping the primary tasks as emergency reception and integration of those who 
had arrived.  
 
1.1 Emergency reception of refugees and asylum-seekers 
When asked to describe what the municipality had experienced, the interviewees 
began their response by describing the arrival of displaced people. Interviewee A recalled as 
follows; 
Yes, well, in mid-September people started coming from North by train because, if 
you look at the geography, we have a common border with Sweden. They took trains 
and buses north then came over the border and started coming down south to larger 
cities. It was around the 15th of September when it started in our city. The border 
control wasn’t there because we have open borders with Sweden. Eventually, little by 
little, in about two weeks, 850 people arrived in our city only, and some people went 
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all the way down to Helsinki. So, that is how it all started here. People arrived at the 
railway stations, and what happened was that we received a phone call from, I don’t 
know how you call it, the guys that check your tickets, when train left up north, telling 
“now we have 35 people coming to [your city]” or “now we have 40 persons coming 
to [your city]” and so on. Every night some hours before the arrival, we had these 
calls and had to take some action. (Interviewee A) 
Interviewee B recounted with a similar emphasis on the arrival of people; 
In our city, we started having a big flow of Syrian citizens in the summer of 2013. It 
was the end of August to September, due to the war in Syria. They arrived in our city 
by train. When the situation started becoming an emergency as there were so many 
people arriving at the central railway station, the municipality realized that 
something had to be done. The city council approved an emergency act, let’s call it 
like this, to face the emergency. This act basically allowed the municipality to open a 
special center, an emergency center, on each side of the railway station, to talk to the 
people to understand why they were arriving and what they were asking for. Imagine, 
it was almost autumn and the weather was not so easy for them to lay down outside 
of the railway station. (Interviewee B) 
The situation, however, was notably dissimilar for Municipality C, which did not directly 
experience an influx of people. In fact, Interviewee C recalled that the city did not share the 
same sentiment or sense of urgency with the rest of the members in the working group; 
Since joining EUROCITIES, I have been interested in the Migration and Integration 
Working Group. I attended some meetings. I took part in speed-networking and 
shared good practice of some of the projects we are working on that demonstrated 
integration and cohesion, I am not saying we are a perfect city; we have a long way 
to go but we have done really well. What I found was that when I was attending these 
meetings, the discussions were around the huge emergencies, such as cities like 
Athens, and what they were dealing with because of where they were based and the 
islands around Greece. Our city, on the other hand, is not on the border; it’s set 
inland, [inaudible] compared to other European cities, and I just felt that we were 
ahead in terms of integration, but integration was not the primary focus of the 
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working group at the time because they were dealing with these huge emergencies. 
For them, it was about numbers, putting up emergency buildings, camps, and so on. 
That was what they wanted the discussions to be around. Quite rightly, that was the 
priority at the time. (Interviewee C) 
All these personal accounts emphasize the centrality of municipal capacity in the matter as 
opposed to other possible qualities that could have framed the issue, including but not limited 
to ideology and local and cultural identity, or existing legal frameworks, such as the Dublin 
Regulation. It was a matter of whether or not the municipalities would be able to receive an 
unprecedented number of people.  
 
2. Expected behavior 
 The interviewees emphasized the value of being connected to members of other 
municipalities in the network, share their concerns, and learn from the successful cases as 
they continuously dealt with the challenges especially in times of crisis. While such 
exchanges of expertise are one of the formal functions and objectives of EUROCITIES and 
interviewees explicitly express genuine appreciation for the opportunities and platforms, it is 
worth noting that the personal accounts below also indicated a sense of obligation to 
reciprocate the benefits of learning and sharing when feasibility or usefulness of the 
knowledge gained within the network were discussed. The findings additionally suggest that 
there was a regional difference in how the interviewees perceived the utility and usefulness 
of the shared knowledge.  
 
2.1 Reciprocity 
Learning and sharing—Interviewee B expressed how valuable it had been to gain insights 
into the types of projects that other municipalities excelled at; 
Initially, we were really interested in sharing our stories with Athens, but then 
valuable inputs also came from the cities in northern Europe. They are really skilled 
at implementing an integration process. We learned, for example, how they organized 
language courses and addressed public health problems. They are really ahead of us 
in terms of the integration process. (Interviewee B) 
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Similarly, Interviewee C illustrated how simple it had been to get in touch with one another 
within the network to exchange opinions and suggestions; 
It is great being involved in EUROCITIES because I can tap into some fantastic 
friends and colleagues, you can just contact right away and have a discussion. We 
often refer cities to each other. “Have a chat with Berlin”, that sort of thing. It is 
really positive in that respect. There are common concerns and kind of common 
solutions as well, but how we bridge that gap and how we get there is the key thing 
in sharing some of the good practice. (Interviewee C) 
Interviewee C also stressed the significance of being able to ‘give’ in addition to gaining 
knowledge and insight from her peers; 
We have been able to give a little bit more than we receive. We learn from each other 
all the time; I have learned about so many projects other cities are doing that are 
absolutely brilliant. I am actually thinking about how it would differ to what we are 
doing in our city, and if it does not work here, how could we make it work. I think that 
is how all the cities think about our projects as well. (Interviewee C) 
 
Regional difference in the sentiment toward learning and sharing—Interviewee A shared an 
instance, where one of the collaborative projects that emerged out of the discussion within 
the working group was not applicable to her municipality; 
Of course, [the 2015/2016 crisis] was a big issue, so we have a lot of discussions still 
[within Migration and Integration Working Group]. EUROCITIES and the working 
group, and especially the southern cities, such as Athens and Barcelona, launched 
this initiative, called Solidarity Cities, and that was also discussed. We hear our 
country had difficulty with joining the Solidarity Cities because, in our legislation, it 
is the national side that decides who will be granted a residence permit. We can’t call 
Munich and say “send us 50 people”; we have to go through the national side. 
(Interviewee A) 
Interviewee B, on the other hand, strongly identified with Athens and Barcelona as they were 
confronted with similar challenges and tackling similar obstacles; 
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You know the current chair of the working group is Athens, right? Athens is another 
city facing similar problems. In one occasion, the Chair, the representative from 
Athens, asked the 22 cities that had gathered at that time; “do you have any idea how 
many illegal immigrants you have in your municipality?” Nobody had an answer. 
This is the kind of a question only a city like Athens can ask, or [name of Municipality 
B] or Barcelona because they are facing an incredible flow of people. If you ask cities 
like Tampere or Stockholm, they probably have the precise number. In cities like 
[Municipality B] and Athens, we literally have no idea. Sharing the situation with 
Athens is so interesting for us. (Interviewee B) 
Consequently, Interviewee B found it rather unrealistic to implement the ideas gained from 
‘northern’ cities into her municipality; 
While we are facing emergencies, they are really integrating people. I think at the 
moment; we are going in reverse. Our problem at the moment is not even integration. 
It is the reception again. I do not know what will happen in the next three months, but 
we are facing again the problem of reception, and integration is something we can 
do later when these people obtain legal permission to stay. How can we integrate 
people that are staying illegally, you know? I think the situation is becoming harder 
in our municipality, but when we gathered in Amsterdam last May, I saw an 
incredible project, about work integration, language learning, and social inclusion. 
The further up north you go, the better their integration system seems to be. They do 
an incredible job, as you can see in their effort of integrating people from different 
religions. In our city at the moment, it is really sad to say that we are facing a situation 
where the central government does not seem to set integration as their final goal 
anymore; their focus is public safety, public security and so on instead. (Interviewee 
B) 
  
3. Facilitating governance arrangement 
The interviewees mentioned multiple mechanisms that would facilitate their 
operation. Those from municipalities spoke of the local arrangement, in which municipalities 
coordinated action in between the national government and local or third-sector 
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organizations. In addition, Interviewee E indicated a few forms of steering as well as serving 
the functions as a proxy to the municipalities and possibly to the external partners.  
 
3.1 Coordination 
Through formalized structure—Interviewee C presented an instance where vertical and 
horizontal cooperation was sufficiently formalized; 
We have what we call Migration Strategic Board, which oversees migration in the 
city, brings together partners to understand migration, and collectively looks for 
solutions. All migration work reports to this particular board. The chair of this board 
is an advisor to the national government. You have a really good link there. 
(Interviewee C) 
This structure has successfully incorporated local communities, third-sector, and a tool to 
disseminate information to relevant actors; 
We also have Migration Partnership, this is where the migrant third-sector 
organizations support asylum-seekers, refugees, or destitution. They form part of the 
partnership, which feeds into the Migration Strategic Board. The partnership has two 
seats at that board. There is a structure, and there is a strategic part to it and an 
operational part to it, and there is a blog. (Interviewee C) 
These ties and tools helped the municipality aggregate evidence to support the validity of its 
demand when negotiating with the national government;  
Our map shows that new migrants are coming to the city area where it is highly 
populated, but people live there because it is cheaper, access to housing is easier, 
everyone in the same community lives there, you share the common language, lots of 
shops are there, and access to the city center is easy. Lots of properties are procured 
in that kind of areas, and that creates tension because, for example, there might not 
be enough school places. It is our role to influence national policy on some of the 
work that is delivered locally, so that might be that we do not want the Home Office 
to be procuring properties in this particular area because we have not secured 
enough spaces for schools or decent-sized accommodations. (Interviewee C) 
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Through ad-hoc endorsement and management of local organizations—Municipality C was 
the only case that demonstrated a formalized, more permanent structure designed to tackle 
challenges associated with migration. Other interviewees recounted how a similar structure 
was prepared on an ad-hoc basis to contract out the necessary tasks;  
During 2014, the municipality organized a more central system for reception because 
as you can imagine you could not keep men and women, aged and minors, all together 
in the center. So, the municipality signed a protocol with the Home Office, the interior 
ministry. [inaudible] The home office would provide some money to our municipality, 
and [name of the city] organized reception through a public call. You know, so we 
organized a public call, and organizations like corporations, foundations, and 
associations, participated to this bid and they sort of won a slot to the reception. They 
would offer buildings where they could receive people. Through this public call, we 
distributed these organizations public money because the buildings the municipality 
was able to provide were not enough. (Interviewee B) 
Interviewee A added that Municipality A intended to take charge and ‘manage’ the non-state 
organizations in the process of crisis response; 
I called someone directly through mobile phones and made the connection between 
the city and the migration office. The mayor and leaders of the city decided that we 
would make this a humanitarian crisis and that we needed to help people. This was 
also the message to the migration authorities that [name of the city] was willing to 
help and at the same time we wanted to take the lead in the situation locally. We did 
not want all kinds of private entrepreneurs and associations to work here in [name 
of the city] or if they did, we wanted to keep a certain degree of control over what 
was happening in our area, so this was the message. I guess we were the only city 
acting so actively toward the migration office. Many cities helped [...], but we were 
the only ones that did not have, for example, the Red Cross operating emergency 
shelters. They were all under our control at that moment. (Interviewee A) 
 
3.2 Steering  
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While municipalities made an effort to coordinate action with multiple actors, the 
secretariat of EUROCITIES set forth the underlying policy frameworks and the terms of 
projects, under which municipalities would exert further efforts. Yet, as these means are non-
binding in general, municipalities do not face formal sanctions when they fail to comply. 
 
Through setting policy frameworks—In the early 2000s, EUROCITIES introduced 
Integrating Cities, a policy framework, under which a number of projects were initiated 
subsequently. The framework constitutes a charter that functions as a set of guiding principles 
for signatory cities; 
[Integrating Cities] is a policy framework that was launched in cooperation with the 
European Commission. There is a charter, Integrating Cities Charter, which all 
members can sign at each local level. Today, we have 39 signatories. The charter sets 
forth cities’ commitments to integrate migrants and to embrace the diversity of its 
population. By signing the charter, cities engage themselves to reach these 
commitments in the overall integration as well as integration through services. Within 
the framework of Integrating Cities, we run the projects [...] and try to implement 
them in a way that resonates with the commitments that the cities have signed up for. 
Every two years, we compile a report on the progress the cities have made. It’s a 
monitoring report if you want [to call it that way], to check where they are in the 
process of fulfilling the commitments and what they do to reach them. The most recent 
report was published last October. (Interviewee E)  
Interviewee A spoke about how the charter would be touched on and guide the migration 
strategy at the municipality level; 
Well, EUROCITIES has the charter for integration issues in cities, and we are one of 
the signatories. Because of the national legislation, we have to make an integration 
plan for the city every four years. Since we have signed the charter, it has been one 
of the documents we always add to our own strategy. We take the document into 
consideration and always go back and see where we are. EUROCITIES also ask how 
we are doing with the charter, every two years I think, they have this evaluation 
process going all the time. I know there are issues we need to do, such as 
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procurement; we are not buying or procuring goods and services in the way the 
charter wants us to do. It is a little bit difficult to make what it wants us to do a 
priority, but in some areas like children’s schooling, I think we are very advanced. I 
think the charter is one of the things that guide us and lead us. Then again, 
EUROCITIES is not leading our policy I would say. Sometimes we want to bring the 
ideas to EUROCITIES to lead their policy. (Interviewee A) 
The remark by Interviewee A above also implied that compliance does not take the form of 
a blind, unquestioned obedience.  
 
Though funded projects—Interviewee E described how EUROCITIES’ Brussels office 
would organize and run projects, pointing out the members of the secretariat were in charge 
of finding funding sources and external partners, drafting a project, and recruiting and 
selecting participating cities; 
We got a grant from the Open Society Institute, to prepare for two mentoring visits 
on the integration of young refugees and education. For this, we launched a call in 
the working group announcing two cities would be hosting mentoring visits, where 
two additional cities that are more advanced on the topic [make a visit] as a mentor, 
and they exchange experiences. Then the hosting cities have to come up with an action 
plan, and this action plan is done in collaboration with the mentor. We organized two 
mentoring visits; one took place in Thessaloniki. Zurich and Amsterdam visited 
Thessaloniki as mentors, and they helped [Thessaloniki] write an action plan on 
education for refugees. Thanks to this project, Thessaloniki adopted new measures 
according to the action plan. (Interviewee E) 
The core mechanism was evident in another instance as well; 
We ran [a] project in collaboration with Migration Work, which is a think tank and 
an expert on the topic of migration. In Brussels, we launched a call using our mailing 
list and website to look for the cities that wanted to be the mentee and also cities that 
wanted to be the mentor, so there were two different calls. We collected responses in 
Brussels and chose which cities should visit where. We discussed with the selected 
cities in advance to prepare the visits and set the agenda, then we went there to see 
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how it worked. With the help of Migration Work, who monitored every step, the cities 
wrote their action plan, and we were able to issue them in the end. (Interviewee E) 
When asked whether projects would normally emerge top-down or bottom-up, Interviewee 
E confirmed the former; 
It comes mainly from us. [...] When we have a new call from the European 
Commission that they will fund a new project, we come up with partners, such as 
Migration Work or the European Volunteer Center. We also come up with concept 
notes for the project, and we discuss it with the cities. We send out the concept notes 
with a call and announce we are going to work on this project. In the concept notes, 
we lay out like this; are you interested [in joining]? If so, why? On what topic? We 
receive responses from the cities. We receive all the information with regard to the 
questions we ask on what they want, and we choose [the cities] and the topics. In a 
way, [projects] come from us, but we try to [respond] to the needs of the cities. Then, 
we integrate them into our concept notes. (Interview E) 
 
3.3 Delegation 
The soft measures mentioned above suggest that the Secretariat in Brussels is an 
intermediary or a proxy between its member cities external partners, where EUROCITIES 
would speak ‘on behalf’ of member cities to the external partners. Interviewee E consistently 
spoke from the perspective of member cities during the interview. When she was asked what 
the crisis was about to EUROCITIES as a whole, the response consisted of what ‘cities’ had 
encountered;  
Some cities are transit places, others are the destination, and even within these 
classifications, every city faces different challenges because they are the frontline of 
the internal reception. Cities are where people actually come. Even if it is only for 
transit, they come. [The reception] necessitates certain services, such as housing, 
language courses, training, or vocational training, not only for asylum-seekers but 
also those who have received asylum and decided to stay. There is a number of 
changes that have emerged, and the cities are the first to be impacted because they 
are the ones dealing with the people arriving on the ground at the local level. What 
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we saw within our members was a general trend, in which they took leadership 
although it was not their role and they did not always have the capacity to do so. We 
saw they tried implementing a new way of working. (Interviewee E) 
She also spoke on behalf of cities when asked who she would need to take into consideration 
in her own day-to-day operation; 
We do general advocacy work to make the voice of cities heard. [In the migration 
theme], we try to showcase what the cities are doing and what kind of help they need 
in order to continue doing the good things. As I have told you about the city of 
Gdansk, the national idea, conception, or reaction to the refugees was not very nice. 
We saw Gdansk making a choice to cherish the welcoming culture, which is 
completely on the opposite side of what the national government was doing. Because 
of this, [Gdansk] did not know what to do exactly. [...] They did not know how to deal 
with the people arriving. They wanted to know from other cities what to do. This is 
how and why our network matters. We connect these cities together so they can share 
their experience. They can all be together at the same table and discuss all things like 
“how did you do this?”, “we tried hard to engage this stakeholder”, or “you have to 
have clear distinctions of this, and this”. (Interviewee E) 
 
4. Challenges, obstacles, and how the actors make sense of them 
Interviewees also revealed several organizational challenges and obstacles 
characterized by a jurisdictional tension between a municipality and the national government, 
whose legislation and decisions tended to hamper the local effort, and a gap between strategic 
vision and implementation of the outcome of collaborative projects. This also leads back to 
the facilitating mechanisms in the sense that the local and network mechanisms were two 
detached streams unless the outcome of a project were to be fully transferred to the municipal 
level.   
  
4.1 Jurisdictional tension 
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National legislation and intergovernmental arrangements—Interviewees presented how the 
overall stance to the migration crisis and an influx of displaced people could differ at the 
national and local level and the gap would interrupt the municipal operation;  
In 2014 and 2015, the reception system became better and better. In 2016, the 
Schengen Agreement became suspended. Germany, Norway, France, and Austria, 
decided to close their border as if they were trying to say “this is enough, you should 
do something to identify people and stop them. It is not acceptable that all of them 
are just crossing the border without control”. Because the borders were closed, we 
were forced to start identifying them and realized that now they had to stay longer in 
our city. One month, two months, or three months, there was no way for them to cross 
the border to reach their destination. In 2016, we could see that they started to ask 
for asylum in our country. This was a completely different way of managing the 
situation. [...] This meant that they would ask for asylum in [name of the city] and 
you stay here until you receive the decision regarding your claim. This takes time. 
(Interviewee B) 
A subsequent change in the national migration system further worsened the situation in 
Municipality B; 
As you probably know, as one of the latest developments, with a new government and 
new Home office, the law changed in December 2018. The law regarding asylum 
became much stricter. It became nearly impossible for these people to obtain the 
status as a refugee. It has been two months, and we really see how the situation has 
started changing again. We have the city full of people with no permission to stay and 
no recognition of asylum. They are no refugees, they have no permission to stay, they 
have just become illegal people. Our centers again are full of people, but they are not 
asylum-seekers this time; they are asylum-seekers who had their applications denied. 
We do not know what to do with them. We really do not know what to do with them. 
They are supposed to leave the country, but they will not get to do it. They would 
never go back. Yet, they can’t cross the border, and they are basically staying illegally 
in the country and the city, looking for something that, at the moment, we don’t know 
exactly what it is. (Interviewee B) 
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Similarly, Interviewee A exhibited that national migration agency could easily alter or 
interfere with the strategy at the municipality level; 
The migration office wanted to move people who need hospital care to the University 
Hospital in our city because they are the ones to decide when people are staying and 
where. They also wanted to send here families with children because of the schooling 
possibility. As a result, we have a lot of families and a lot of people with some health 
issues to take care of. Or maybe you have a family member who is very sick and needs 
care. (Interviewee A) 
It should be noted these obstacles may be one of the factors why municipalities would seek 
access to supranational institutions via EUROCITIES beyond the national government; 
In general, [dealing with the national government] is quite hard because national 
governments sometimes do not listen to cities and do not put them at the negotiation 
table or give them the funds or the financial capacity to deal with the problems they 
are facing. In the previous projects, we visited Athens, one of the partners of the 
project, and saw how difficult it was for them to manage things because they did not 
have the official competence when it came to asylum-seekers and refugees in general. 
For instance, they did not have the competence in the reception of migrants and 
housing provision, but the national level did not help much. At one point, Athens had 
to take on the competencies that they did not possess and they just decided to have 
them to do things [...]. (Interviewee E) 
  
4.2 Organizational gap 
The second challenge surrounding EUROCITIES is an organizational gap that hampers the 
process of implementing an outcome of a EUROCITIES project at the local level;  
One thing that is a bit of a shame is that each project is short, two years only. You do 
not have an implementation phase. It is also difficult for us to follow up years later, 
go and check whether the cities managed to do what they planned on doing. We tried 
to start this work this summer, interviewing the cities that took part in our projects 
years ago, in order to see what is going on, and also to evaluate the impact of the 
projects. It really depends on the city and the project. It also depends on the 
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motivation. When we launch a call for an EU-funded project, for instance, the people 
who reply are those from the European department. Then, when the project is 
accepted, the members that actually work with us are from different departments, 
such as the migration department or volunteering department. They have a different 
motivation: “why are we working on that, I don’t understand, I don’t speak English 
anyway”. It doesn’t happen all the time of course, but in some cases, it can happen 
that there is no motivation or the people are not the right ones. That could be hard. 
(Interviewee E) 
Interviewee D raised a similar concern as one of the potential reasons why the municipality 
had become less motivated to participate in projects organized by EUROCITIES; 
Quite recently a new working group was created on drug abuse, that was quite 
interesting for our city, so I contacted different areas in the city council, which were 
youth and health. Then there was the problem of language. Most people in these areas 
were quite close to retiring [...] and their English was not very good, so this was 
creating difficulty with participating actively in the debate within a working group. 
[..] Hopefully, in the coming years, more young people will have a chance to 
participate in this working group. (Interviewee D) 
Municipality D, while it is not plausible to assume a direct association, has also reduced 
participation to EUROCITIES in recent years; 
I think we are in some way keeping a medium interest in the network. We are not 
abandoning the network, but we are not so active. Some areas are more acting, and 
some others which were more active in the past. (Interviewee D) 
Such strategy-implementation gap in the EUROCITIES context is almost equivalent of the 
‘network-member gap’ provided that the network steers the formation of strategies while it 
depends on member cities to implement them.  
 
4.3 Inner logic 
Limits of competence—When asked if there was anything that both municipalities and the 
network could do more or could have done differently in addressing the crisis, interviewees 
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suggested not only their expectation toward the network as an intermediary but also the 
existence of an institutional limit to what the network could achieve; 
I do not think there is much more that EUROCITIES could do with the resources they 
have. I think it is important that there is our voice in discussions with the Commission. 
I think EUROCITIES should deliver the message that migration is more than just 
border control, and we should have some legal means so that people do not need to 
arrive illegally. As EUROCITIES is a network of cities, one of the things they have 
been discussing very well with the Commission is that if you want people to integrate, 
you have to discuss it with the local people because that is where it is happening. 
(Interviewee A) 
Similarly, while emphasizing the value of disseminating the voices of cities through 
EUROCITIES, which would otherwise remain unheard, Interviewee B remembered the 
difficulty of devising collective solutions as each member city tended to represent its own 
interests;  
At the political level, you can make statements; you can make what is happening 
public, write reports, and send these reports to the Commission basically to ask the 
European Union to pay attention to municipalities, much more attention. At the 
moment, at this level, I do not see much more we can do because what is happening 
at the political level involves different approaches. [inaudible] I hope there will be 
more funding that we can apply and realize effective projects at the local level. I am 
not able to think at the national level obviously. This is a very local level. At the same 
time, this is really sad that every municipality thinks for itself, you know what I mean; 
“Okay, that city does not seem to be willing to work with us. I have to focus on what 
is going on in mine.” (Interviewee B) 
In comparison to the awareness of the organizational limit, the interviewees were more 
satisfied with the efforts they had invested. When asked whether the municipality has dealt 
with the crisis in a satisfactory manner, Interviewee B, for instance, responded as follows; 
Yes. I would think our municipality is investing a lot of people working on this issue 
to face the situation. I think we are doing our best in the situation. I feel lucky to be 
in one of the most active cities in this matter, but of course, you can always do better, 
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but the response from the local residents has been unbelievable. I would say that 
every type of effort has been done and it will continue to be done in the near future.  
(Interviewee B) 
Likewise, Interviewee A provided the following response; 
 I would say yes. There is no hard feeling for not doing our best. (Interviewee A) 
  
Rationalization of the organizational flaws—How do the actors make sense of the overall 
dynamics, which is subject to the limit of the network’s competence and rather individualistic 
interests among the member cities? When asked how they would respond to skepticism 
against the impact of TMNs3, the interviewees provided similar rationales. Namely, what the 
network could offer may be limited and indeed symbolic by itself when confronted with real-
life issues, but municipalities would make the dynamics more pragmatic; 
I have to say we are the ones to make the network useful. Of course, I can’t influence 
too much on who is working there or what kind of contacts they have within the 
Commission, but what I can do from here is actively taking part. EUROCITIES is 
also a learning network. I am getting more and more professional training myself by 
discussing with my colleagues. I think that is more than just symbolic. [...] What I’m 
looking from EUROCITIES is the learning and then just a little voice added to the 
big block of the cities, also from our city so that we can influence the bigger picture 
in Europe, and bringing up the local perspective in Europe. (Interviewee A) 
Interviewee B and E maintained that municipalities ensured that actual action would follow 
a symbolic gesture; 
We as a municipality sign a lot of agreements, conventions, and protocols. Obviously, 
this is not enough to sign general agreements if you do not organize anything 
practical afterward. I would say not all mayors of municipalities are available to sign 
an agreement, depending on the political situations. Our current mayor is really open 
to receiving migrants and sees the potential of migration and what it means for these 
                                               
3 Caponio (2018) points out that the member cities of a TMN do not necessarily support the official, 
instrumental goals of the network and instead focus their attention on “legitimation of existing policies, identity-
building and positioning of the city at a European level” (p.2054).  
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people leaving their country because of a terrible war to obtain refugee status. Not 
every mayor would do this. Participating in the network could definitely be symbolic 
and political, but in our city, an operational answer follows a symbolic and political 
action. I never read statements by the mayor thinking these are just words, and they 
are going to do nothing, you know. (Interviewee B) 
 
Signing a declaration or an initiative is a symbolic thing. It is important to show that 
the politicians at the local level are involved, want to make changes, get involved in 
those topics; of course, symbols are important especially in our time where there are 
many counter-narratives against refugees and migrants. These symbols could counter 
them. That’s one point. On the other hand, our work on the ground in the cities and 
writing action plans and trying to change things are quite practical. When you see 
that some cities do more than the national level does [...] and create a reception 
structure, such as vocational training, language courses, or field training, or also 
[seek] funds from organizations because they do not receive funds from the national 
level, you cannot say it is only symbolic. When you see that some cities try to work 
with UNHCR to finance reception centers or to create housing for the people because 
the national level does not do it, it is not symbolic. It is quite ‘doing things’. 
(Interviewee E) 
 
5. Aligning the findings 
This section endeavors to view the findings through the lenses of informal 
accountability to what, to whom, and by what means. Responses from the interviewees 
presented a plethora of the official, formal notions of accountability that governed the 
network and its member cities, while informal accountability emerged, for instance, as an 
implicit sense of obligation at the municipality and inter-municipality level, and as a subtle 
practice of steering at the network level. These means or mechanisms further configured the 
norm(s) and stakeholders(s) to complete the dynamics.  
Table 5-1 below summarizes the dynamics of accountability at the municipality and 
inter-municipality level. Formally, cities stood for humanitarian principles, stretching the 
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institutional capacity to receive the influx of displaced people, providing food and shelter 
despite a growing sense of uncertainty toward the national government. In order to 
accommodate as many people as possible, municipalities often coordinated action with both 
the national government and local, third-sector organizations, each fulfilling a unique role to 
complement each other. In other words, it involved vertical and horizontal coordination. The 
national government, or the responsible agency or ministry, would provide municipalities 
with an ad-hoc budget when available. With the new budget, the municipality would contract 
out the tasks of service provision to the local organizations who had the means and resources 
to fill the gap. The network situated itself as a bridge between the formal and informal arena. 
Through participation in EUROCITIES, those local measures, as well as obstacles, were 
shared and exchanged with peers across borders. Informally, however, the practice of sharing 
and exchanging ideas presumed reciprocity in order to maintain a delicate balance of mutual 
benefit, indicating that sharing and exchanging just any knowledge would not suffice as the 
interviewees displayed a regional difference of opinions between the cities in northern and 
southern Europe. The way Interviewee A and B recognized Barcelona and Athens differently, 
or how Interviewee C focused on ‘giving’ suggested the perceived utility and practicality of 
knowledge and experience that were shared within the network could influence the interest, 
motivation, or attitude toward each other. The structure of informal accountability, thus, 
revolved around sharing and exchanging ‘applicable’ knowledge among peers under the 
common obligation of reciprocating.  
 
Table 5-1. Municipalities and formal and informal accountability. 
Municipalities To what To whom By what means 
Formal 
Emergency service 
provision 
Those that have arrived 
Vertical and horizontal 
cooperation 
Sharing and exchanging 
knowledge 
Informal Reciprocity 
Peers (other 
municipalities) 
Sharing and exchanging 
‘applicable’ knowledge  
58 
 
Table 5-2 below summarizes the accountability dynamics of EUROCITIES, or more 
precisely, its Brussels office. Formally, the secretariat is driven to support its member cities 
and assist them to overcome the challenges of the migration crisis by establishing connections 
to the EU institution, especially the EU Commission, and deriving EU-funded projects that 
are designed to enhance the institutional capacity of municipalities. The informal aspect of 
accountability, on the other hand, appeared to center around the directionality of ‘to what and 
by what means the secretariat holds member cities accountable’. At this informal level, the 
members of EUROCITIES’ Brussels office supporting projects and initiatives were in charge 
of not only finding funded projects but also drafting the details of the projects and selecting 
member cities to participate in them. While Interviewee E clarified that the process of 
determining the details of any project would incorporate the preferences of member cities, 
the final decisions to shape the project in a certain manner nevertheless rested upon the 
members of the secretariat. In this light, member cities were subject to the ‘terms and 
conditions’ of the project they would take part, and the secretariat, as the organizer or the 
project, would hold the capacity to expect member cities to abide by the project objectives 
as well as the relevant policy frameworks, under which the project had been formulated. 
However, the steering would not easily come to fruition unless the strategy-implementation 
gap that divided the network and municipalities were to be bridged. 
 
Table 5-2. Secretariat and formal and informal accountability. 
Secretariat To what To whom By what means 
Formal Capacity building of cities 
Member cities 
Project funders 
Ensuring vertical and 
horizontal connections 
EU-funded projects 
Informal 
Policy frameworks 
Project objectives 
Member cities 
(External partners) 
Steering via project 
management 
 
 Lastly, Table 5-3 and 5-4 are an alternative configuration of the formal and informal 
accountability structure, illuminating what Romzek (2014) calls “tension between formal and 
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informal accountability system” (p.832). Each compares the perceptions of accountability 
between municipalities and the secretariat at the formal and informal level each. Romzek 
(2014) clarifies that the tension may “arise from disincentives built into the policies and/or 
contracts or process complexities” (Ibid.). What emerges is a potential source of discrepancy.  
 
Table 5-3. Comparison of formal accountability between municipalities and the secretariat. 
 To what To whom By what means 
Municipalities Humanitarianism Those that have arrived 
Vertical and horizontal 
cooperation 
Sharing and exchanging 
knowledge 
Secretariat 
Capacity building of 
cities 
Member cities 
Ensuring vertical and 
horizontal connections 
EU-funded projects 
 
In terms of formal accountability, as Table 5-3 indicates, municipalities engaged themselves 
with an urgent humanitarian relief, while the secretariat envisioned capacity building to assist 
cities. The former demanded an immediate allocation of money while the latter provided a 
robust structure, which did not necessarily include direct access to funding. At an informal 
level as illustrated in Table 5-4, the discrepancy between municipalities and the secretariat 
persisted. Municipalities focused on peers while the secretariat strived for steering and it was 
no longer about ensuring connection of municipalities per se.  
 
Table 5-4 Comparison of informal accountability between municipalities and the secretariat. 
 To what To whom By what means 
Municipalities Reciprocity 
Peers (other 
municipalities) 
Sharing and exchanging 
‘applicable’ knowledge 
Secretariat 
Policy frameworks 
Project objectives 
Member cities 
(External partners) 
Steering via project 
management 
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6. Summary 
This chapter presented the findings of the expert interviews. Through demonstrating the 
interviewees’ perception of the crisis, informal behavioral rules, facilitating arrangements, as 
well as the organizational challenges and obstacles, the chapter revealed the following key 
aspects:1) while the accountability structure shifted between the formal and informal levels, 
the ultimate objective of addressing the crisis situation remained the same, and 2) there was 
a sign of discrepancy, if not a disagreement, both at the formal and informal level between 
municipalities and the secretariat indicating an interruption of connectivity as a network. The 
next chapter will further investigate these two key findings in terms of 1) what can be inferred 
in terms of what accountability is and what it entails in the realm of TMNs, and 2) what are 
the implications of the type of transnational accountability that has emerged out of the 
findings to the 2015/2016 migration crisis. 
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Chapter 6.  Final Assessment  
This assessment will connect the aspects introduced as the central concepts at the beginning 
of the thesis, accountability and transnational accountability, to the key findings from 
Chapter 6, then explore the implication to migration governance as illustrated through the 
expert interviews. First, the chapter argues that the meanings of accountability which have 
emerged from the findings are more emancipatory than the existing notions and the 
secretariat pays attention to complementarity of their advocacy and steering efforts with the 
broader EU setting. Next, it will label these attributes as ‘exceeding’ and ‘transformative’ 
informal institutions and add them to an existing typology of informal institutions. At the end 
of the chapter, these assessments will be applied to the 2015/2016 migration crisis and the 
discursive trends that surrounded it to shed light onto the latent abilities of TMNs outside of 
the conventional state-based framework. 
 
1. Meanings of transnational accountability 
How do the findings actually deviate from the existing accountability literature? 
While the existing literature on accountability in general, as well as transnational 
accountability given that it is said to be similar at a conceptual level (Macdonald, 2014), 
stresses the characteristics of rewards and sanctions and portray accountability as constraints, 
the findings exhibited a rather emancipatory trait, freeing and stimulating the actors towards 
taking action.  
Earlier, this project introduced multiple definitions of accountability, which 
predominantly consisted of the system compliance, as well as rewards and sanctions to 
reinforce them. The definitions ranged from adherence to normative standards (Bovens, 
2010, p.947), a “legal obligation” (Considine, 2002, p.22), the processes for the involved 
individuals and organizations to “answer for their actions and consequences” (Deloffre, 
2016, p.726), to an “obligation to explain and justify” one’s conduct (Bovens, 2007b, p.187). 
The findings, on the contrary, were overwhelmingly proactive in comparison to what the 
existing conceptualizations has outlined both at the formal and informal level although the 
sense of obligation or answerability was present. At a formal level, where statements by the 
interviewees indeed contained an abundance of narratives and personal accounts of their 
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experience of the crisis at the municipal level, what triggered the formation of accountability 
configuration was the influx of displaced individuals. It shaped the sense of responsibility 
among the municipalities of the interviewees as well as the secretariat to react to it, the former 
by addressing the urgent situations at hand, and the latter assisting municipalities to build the 
capacity to do so. This central pillar determined whom the actors’ sense of accountability 
was intended to: from municipalities to those who have arrived and from the secretariat to 
affected member cities. Municipalities invested efforts and resources to coordinate actions 
with other actors in order to overcome the crisis and relied on EUROCITIES to share and 
exchange knowledge and experience. The secretariat ensured that the forum and channel 
would be available for the municipalities to share and exchange and launched EU-funded 
projects intended to mitigate the challenges. At a more informal level, the focal point of the 
accountability relationship shifted among the interviewees while the ultimate objective 
remained the same. The municipalities expected reciprocity and mutual benefits out of what 
was being shared, whereas at the secretariat level, Interviewee E emphasized the cruciality 
of steering member cities via project management. In other words, the participants expressed 
a sense of responsibility and, to a degree, obligation, but they were not intended to restrict or 
mold their behavior into certain predetermined manners. On the contrary, these perceptions 
prompted the actors to expand their competence.  
 
2. Sensibility to complementarity and compatibility to formal institutions 
The second key findings, the discrepancy in the perception of accountability between 
municipalities and the secretariat, illuminates the structure the secretariat offered and 
operated within was fluid and reactive. As an umbrella organization of municipalities, it is 
publicly known that the members of the secretariat advocates and delivers their voices to the 
relevant EU institutions, EU commission in particular4. However, it needs to be taken into 
account whether and in what way the secretariat is possibly affected by the EU institutions, 
there preferences, and the environment in which it conducts its advocacy work. The findings 
                                               
4 Shapovalova (2019), for instance, describes in her effort to unfold the impact of interest groups in the field of 
EU foreign policy that supranational institutions are most heavily lobbied (p.425). Yet certain domains 
traditionally reserve the powers to formulate agenda and make decisions for the Council, and those policy fields 
are particularly challenging for advocacy groups to break through (Ibid.).  
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demonstrated that while the secretariat did listen to the demands from its member cities, not 
all were likely to be met by operating funded projects. Nevertheless, when viewed differently, 
it would also be possible to argue that this was a gesture by the secretariat to be as realistic 
and practical it could be in order to secure a tangible response from the EU institutions, rather 
than delivering what municipalities demanded, unfiltered, as a proxy. Such roles and 
responsibilities of the secretariat resonate closely to the conditions where policy 
entrepreneurs are likely to thrive. According to Bakir and Jarvis (2018) policy entrepreneurs 
an individual who “sell policy ideas to elite decision-makers” (p.465), and policy 
entrepreneurship is a “context-specific” activity (Ibid.). The authors claim that policy 
entrepreneurs function as “institutional entrepreneurs”, thus successfully achieving a desired 
institutional change, “when they are enabled by structural, institutional, and agency-level 
complementarities” (Ibid., p.466). In other words, EUROCITIES, the entrepreneurs, need to 
identify or establish a context, where their demands and those of the EU Commission 
cooperate and reinforce each other. For instance, the members of the secretariat would not 
be able to outright negotiate allocation of funding to the municipalities knowing it may 
bypass national governments of member states. Considering the internal politics, the 
Commission might as well show reluctance or experience backlash from the member states. 
Endorsing small-scale projects, which only include some of the EUROCITIES member cities 
that resonate with the values as well as the strategies the EU pursues, on the other hand, 
would be less contentious while impacting the network as well as the cities in certain ways. 
In the meantime, this also suggests that EUROCITIES is more of a problem-addressing 
organization instead of a problem-solving one. That is to say, EUROCITIES and EU 
institutions need to be not only complementary but also compatible with each other.  
 
3. Informality, informal institutions, and diverse meanings 
Earlier, this thesis introduced North’s (1990) conceptualization of institutions as the 
“rules of the game” (p.3) in social life and that these institutions were regulated both by 
‘formal’ and ‘informal’ constraints. Informality and informal institutions entailed various 
meanings and are associated with formal institutions positively and negatively, but the 
distinction in between the two can be relatively vague and context-dependent. Indeed, there 
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were multiple ways by which formal and informal institutions interact, and Helmke and 
Levitsky (2004) held the underlying belief when they formulated the four types of informal 
institutions vis-à-vis formal institutions that informal structures “shape the performance of 
formal institutions in important and often unexpected ways” (p.726). That being said, the 
authors identified and classified the four types of informal institutions by whether the 
informal institutions strive for converging or diverging from the intended outcome of formal 
institutions and perceived effectiveness or ineffectiveness of formal institutions: 
‘Complementary’ informal institutions, ‘accommodating’ informal institutions, ‘competing’ 
informal institutions, and ‘substitutive informal institutions’. Table 6-1 below summarizes 
the typology by the two authors. 
 
Table 6-1 Typology of informal institutions by Helmke and Levitsky (2004). 
Outcomes Effective formal institutions Ineffective formal institutions 
Convergent Complementary Substitutive 
Divergent Accommodating Competing 
  
Where in the typology above would the informal accountability that has emerged out 
of the findings situate itself in relation to the formal accountability? At an initial glance, it 
appears most appropriate to classify the informal accountability of municipalities as 
‘complementary’ and that of the secretariat as ‘substitutive’ informal institutions as 
summarized in Table 6-2. To elaborate, it should be fair to state that both municipalities and 
secretariat work towards formal objectives. Thus, the ultimate outcome of the accountability 
dynamics is intended to achieve what formal accountability strives for, addressing the crisis 
situation at hand by providing necessary care of the individuals that have arrived 
(municipalities), and assisting the municipalities to build capacity to do so (the secretariat). 
However, the presumed effectiveness of formal accountability structure diverges between 
these two types of actors. Municipalities, on the one hand, perceive the existing formal 
accountability structure is effective and strive for excelling and demand others to excel within 
the premise of the existing interaction at reciprocating by providing improved utility. On the 
other hand, the informal accountability structure of the secretariat indicates that it aims for 
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exerting an alternative type of influence (steering through project operation via EU 
Commission) to ensure that its official objectives will be achieved incrementally because the 
formal accountability structure does not bestow the secretariat authority to produce tangible 
outcomes. Instead, the secretariat aims for achieving the goals that formal accountability 
structure by itself may not. 
 
Table 6-2 Interaction between formal and informal accountability*. 
 Outcome 
Formal 
accountability 
Types of informal 
institutions 
Municipalities Convergent Effective Complementary 
Secretariat Convergent Ineffective Substitutive 
*Based on the typology by Helmke and Levitsky (2004, p.728) 
 
Nevertheless, the typology does not do justice to the whole accountability structure 
that has emerged; there is a crucial emancipatory characteristic to the informal accountability 
that the respondents demonstrated. In the findings, the municipalities and the secretariat 
construed themselves as the autonomous actors that determined or were capable of 
determining the course of action as a network. Interviewees from municipalities were 
utilizing the network that connected them to their peers proactively, which entailed not only 
learning from another to strengthen their respective project at the local level but also a 
willingness and sense of responsibility to ‘give’ rather than just take. Precisely because the 
municipal actors were proactive, lack of reciprocity and subsequent imbalance of benefits 
frustrated them as each city faced unique situations. Within the secretariat, the respondent 
was confident in confirming that it was the secretariat who steered the course of actions for 
the network as a whole by drafting projects, recruiting and selecting member cities to 
participate in specific projects, and monitoring the progress after the initial launch. In other 
words, these informal mechanisms were the primary vehicle for EUROCITIES, if not 
transnational municipal networks in general, to overcome the skepticism as characterized by 
Caponio (2018). Namely, the informal accountability structure prompts the municipalities to 
utilize TMNs more than as a mere tool to legitimate their policy, build identity, or secure 
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presence at the EU level. Likewise, the informal accountability structure necessitates 
members of the secretariat to take charge and overcome the vulnerability of the formal 
accountability mechanisms, such as the interruptions and discontinuities between strategy 
and implementation and challenges that are inherent to lobbying at the EU level. In other 
words, the intended outcome of the informal accountability is to outperform formal 
accountability, which is deemed neither effective nor ineffective per se, but rather adequate. 
In this sense, it would be appropriate to close this final assessment by proposing a new 
subtype to the informal institutions typology to better capture the dynamics, which is 
elaborated in Table 6-3 as ‘exceeding’ and ‘transformative’ informal institutions.  
 
Table 6-3. Modified typology of informal institutions based on Table 6-1. 
Outcomes 
Effective formal 
institutions 
Ineffective formal 
institutions 
Adequate formal 
institutions 
Convergent Complementary Substitutive Exceeding 
Divergent Accommodating Competing Transformative 
 
The former applies to municipalities, where they strive for exceeding what they are in the 
existing state of accountability, and the latter to the secretariat, who invests its effort to alter 
the dynamics into another that is more effective, thus in fact diverging from the formal 
outcome. Overall, the findings suggest that accountability is not a constraint. Instead, it is an 
impetus for action.  
 
4. Implications to the 2015/2016 migration crisis 
 Before closing this chapter, it is crucial to apply the findings to the 2015/2016 EU 
migration crisis and further explore possible implications. Chapter 4 presented the challenges 
with migration governance with regard to the constructed negative attitudes toward migration 
and migrants as well as the paradox of the state-based ‘migration control’ and migration, 
which is almost inherently transnational. With these premises, it also argued the relevance of 
the issue to this project by linking it to accountability gap, and illuminated the gap by 
mapping different discourses that surrounded the EU’s border regime. The three different 
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discursive trends that were found in the academic literature, namely securitizing, 
humanitarian, and hybrid, indicated a rift between some of the member states and the EU 
institutions, holding each other accountable for solving the crisis, as well as the EU’s 
conscious effort to blend the rhetoric to achieve their objectives, which resulted in 
oxymoronic expressions. That being said, this section examines the accountability structures 
from the findings, or exceeding and transformative informal institutions, vis-à-vis 
accountability gap in the migration crisis and posits the viability of EUROCITIES as an actor.  
 Table 6-4 below summarizes the comparison between the three original discursive 
trends and the new level of analysis, EUROCITIES. There is, especially, a stark contrast 
between securitization discourse and what the findings indicated thus far. While the 
securitization discourse emphasized ‘threat’, the research participants continuously stressed 
the necessity of the adequate service-provision capacity to receive those who have arrived in 
their municipalities. Interviewees did from time to time mention concerns for the local 
residents. For instance, Interviewee A described how her municipality took preventive 
measures against possible public health issues, and Interviewee B stated that even if the 
municipality ignored the situation, the residents would have seen it. Yet, those remarks were 
made under the premise of receiving displaced individuals first rather than turning them 
away. Their view was more practical and focused on ‘getting the job than’ regardless of the 
discourses and strategies at the national as well as the intergovernmental level. Likewise, the 
secretariat’s attitude of circumventing and diverging from the formal accountability for the 
purpose of accomplishing the goals indicated preparedness to cooperate with the necessary 
EU institutions and establish a complementary context and become a compatible partner and 
its fluidity to address. It would not be preposterous to interpret this configuration that 
EUROCITIES or TMNs are flexible and adaptive partners to the EU.  
 
Table 6-4. Three discursive trends regarding the EU’s border regime and comparison with 
EUROCITIES. 
Discourses Securitization Humanitarianism Rationalization 
Problem- 
addressing 
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Level of 
analysis 
Member states 
Member states 
(and academic 
community) 
The EU 
TMNs 
(EUROCITIES) 
Priority 
Internal 
accountability 
External 
Accountability 
Internal and 
External 
accountability 
External 
accountability 
Themes 
National security 
Threat to society 
Us and them 
Control 
Exclusion 
Moral issue 
Care 
Human rights 
Inclusion and 
acceptance 
European value’ 
Tighter control to 
protect human 
rights 
Rescue-through-
interdiction 
Rescue-without-
protection 
Humane 
refoulement 
Practicality 
‘Getting the job 
done’ 
Emergency relief 
Capacity building 
Context building 
Complementarity 
Compatibility 
 
5. Shortcomings of the research and future tasks 
Overall, the findings exposed a distinct form of informal institutions. The 
accountability configuration that emerged out of analysis suggested that informal 
accountability structure that was prevalent among the municipalities as well as the secretariat 
was likely to be a crucial impetus to action that was necessary to overcome the skepticism 
and outperform the limited competence. However, the findings only indicate this new form 
of institutions and is not capable of concluding it. Indeed, there is a lot to be done in the 
future research. First, it will be necessary to collect data from more participants to strengthen 
inferences and make necessary revisions. It will also be ideal to conduct interviews face-to-
face, where the researcher becomes acquainted with the interviewees better and obtains more 
insights. Next, it should expand the scope into other policy fields including migration in non-
crisis conditions. Lastly, the research should also feature global municipal networks to see if 
there is a crucial difference from transnational fora.  
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Summary 
This project aimed for investigating the meanings and functions of transnational 
accountability by analyzing the informal means of organizing accountability in emerging 
transnational governance networks. In this regard, it construed accountability as an 
institutional arrangement the study endeavored to shed light onto a transnational municipal 
network (TMN) named EUROCITIES in an attempt to understand the new realm of 
transnational governance and examined its potential for transcending accountability gap 
among the conventional state-based actors in the 2015/2016 migration crisis. 
Chapter 1 introduced conceptual phenomenon of accountability as well as 
transnational accountability, and discussed what new aspects could possibly emerge when 
transnationality entered the dynamics. Chapter 2 continued to set the foundations of this 
project by visiting the current academic research on transnational municipal networks 
(TMNs), reviewing the existing understanding on what they were, what they do, and how 
they functioned leading to the discussion of possible research gap. Chapter 3 introduced the 
2015/2016 EU migration crisis and explained the relevance of the event to this project. 
Chapter 4 attempted to combine the essence of the preceding chapters into a coherence 
research design. Chapter 5 delivered the findings in details and realigned them in accordance 
with the threefold research questions of 1) To what do the actors of TMNs hold themselves 
accountable? 2) To whom do the actors of TMNs hold themselves accountable? and 3) By 
what means do the actors of TMNs hold themselves accountable. Chapter 6 revisited the 
conceptual framework that were introduced in Chapter 1 and explored further implications 
of the findings to transnational accountability, TMNs and to the migration crisis, including 
possible new meanings.  
The findings exposed a distinct form of accountability that was not restrictive and 
contributed to the existing understanding of the relationship between formal and informal 
institutions. It argued that the meanings of accountability which had emerged from the 
findings were more emancipatory than the existing notions and suggested the secretariat 
strived for establishing complementarity of their advocacy and steering efforts with the 
broader EU setting. Based on these assessments, it labeled these attributes of informal 
accountability at a transnational setting as ‘exceeding’ and ‘transformative’ informal 
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institutions and added them to an existing typology of informal institutions. Lastly, the study 
applied these new types of informal institutions to the 2015/2016 migration crisis and the 
discursive trends that surrounded it in order to shed light onto the latent abilities of TMNs 
outside of the conventional state-based framework to fill the existing accountability gap. 
More specifically, EUROCITIES’ adaptability as a secretariat and willingness to provide 
emergency relief present the TMN as a viable ‘problem-addressing’ partner for the EU. 
However, the findings only indicate this new form of institutions and is not capable of 
concluding it. Instead, there is a lot to be further researched. First, it will be ideal to collect 
data from more participants to strengthen inferences and make necessary revisions. It will 
also be ideal to conduct interviews face-to-face. Next, it should expand into other policy 
fields including migration in non-crisis conditions. Lastly, the research should also feature 
global municipal networks to see if there is a crucial difference from transnational fora.  
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Appendix 1 
Table of that were contacted, date of initial contact and reasons for declining. 
1st 
group Cities Country 
Date of 1st 
contact Reasons for declining 
 
 Vienna Austria 29.11.2018   
 EUROCITIES  
Secretariat Belgium 29.11.2018 
  
 Ghent Belgium 29.11.2018   
 Brno Czech Republic 29.11.2018 
  
 Espoo Finland 6.12.2018   
 Helsinki Finland 6.12.2018 Correspondence stopped.  
 Tampere Finland 6.12.2018   
 Nantes France 6.12.2018   
 Berlin Germany 6.12.2018   
 Chemnitz Germany 6.12.2018   
 Düsseldorf Germany 6.12.2018   
 Hamburg Germany 6.12.2018   
 Leipzig Germany 6.12.2018   
 Munich Germany 6.12.2018   
 Athens Greece 29.11.2018 Correspondence stopped.  
 Budapest Hungary 29.11.2018 Cities have no jurisdiction over migration. 
 
 Genoa Italy 6.12.2018   
 Riga Latvia 6.12.2018 Unavailable.  
 Utrecht Netherlands 29.11.2018   
 Oslo Norway 6.12.2018   
 Gdansk Poland 29.11.2018   
 Poznan Poland 29.11.2018   
 Lisbon Portugal 29.11.2018 Interview was cancelled.  
 Ljubljana Slovenia 29.11.2018 Cities have no jurisdiction over migration. 
 
 Barcelona Spain 29.11.2018 Unavailable.  
 Bilbao Spain 29.11.2018   
 Zaragoza Spain 29.11.2018   
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 Gothenburg Sweden 6.12.2018 Interview did not finalize.  
 Karlstad  Sweden 6.12.2018   
 Malmo Sweden 6.12.2018   
 Stockholm Sweden 6.12.2018   
 Solna Sweden 6.12.2018 Not yet actively participating in the topic. 
 
 Belfast UK 6.12.2018   
 Birmingham UK 6.12.2018   
 Preston UK 6.12.2018   
      
2nd 
group Cities Country Date of contact Reasons for declining 
 
 Antwerp Belgium 14.01.2019   
 Brussels Belgium 14.01.2019   
 Brussels Capital Region Belgium 14.01.2019   
 Ostend Belgium 14.01.2019 Correspondence stopped.  
 Zagreb Croatia 14.01.2019   
 Nicosia Cyprus 14.01.2019   
 Turkish Cypriot community of 
Nicosia Cyprus 14.01.2019 
  
 Prague Czech Republic 14.01.2019 
  
 Aarhus Denmark 14.01.2019 Unavailable.  
 Copenhagen Denmark 14.01.2019   
 Turku Finland 14.01.2019   
 Bordeaux France 14.01.2019   
 Lyon  France 14.01.2019 Not actively participating in the WG. 
 
 Nice Cote d Azur France 14.01.2019   
 Paris France 14.01.2019   
 Rennes Metropole France 14.01.2019   
 Strasbourg France 14.01.2019   
 Toulouse France 14.01.2019 Correspondence stopped.  
 Dresden Germany 17.01.2019   
 Karlsruhe Germany 17.01.2019   
 Kiel Germany 17.01.2019   
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 Mannheim Germany 17.01.2019   
 Stuttgart Germany 17.01.2019   
 Bonn Germany  17.01.2019   
 Milan Italy 17.01.2019   
 Palermo Italy 17.01.2019   
 Turin Italy 17.01.2019   
 Amsterdam Netherlands 17.01.2019   
 Rotterdam Netherlands 17.01.2019   
 The Hague Netherlands 17.01.2019   
 Utrecht Netherlands 17.01.2019   
 Netwerkstad Twente Netherlands  17.01.2019   
 Bydgoszcz Poland 17.01.2019   
 Lublin Poland 17.01.2019   
 Warsaw Poland 17.01.2019   
 Cluj-Napoca Romania 17.01.2019   
 Timisoara Romania 17.01.2019   
 Madrid Spain 17.01.2019   
 Uppsala Sweden 17.01.2019   
 Zürich Switzerland 17.01.2019   
 Besiktas Turkey   No information of contact officer. 
 
 Beylikdüzü Turkey  17.01.2019   
 Konya Turkey 17.01.2019   
 Brighton & Hove UK 17.01.2019   
 Cardiff UK 17.01.2019 Not actively participating in the WG. 
 
 Edinburgh UK 17.01.2019   
 Leeds UK 17.01.2019   
 London UK 17.01.2019 Unavailable.  
 Manchester  UK 17.01.2019   
 Sheffield UK 17.01.2019 Correspondence stopped.  
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Appendix 2 
Interview guide addressed to municipalities 
 
Interview Guide  
*The core questions are written in bold letters.  
*It is crucial for this project to hear your stories and narratives that supplement and elaborate 
factual statements.  
*Approximate duration of the interview session is 60 minutes. 
*The interview will be conducted in English. 
*The interviewer will record the session and refrain from taking intensive notes in order to 
engage herself in the conversation. 
 
Focal points Interview Questions 
1) What your 
city has 
experienced 
so far since 
the onset of 
the EU 
refugee crisis 
The EU refugee crisis exposed grave situations across cities in the EU 
member states. Please describe the situation in your city. For example; what 
was/is the crisis about in your city? How and in what way has the crisis affected 
your city? How is your city different before and after the onset of the crisis? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Do you see the situation has shifted into a new phase today? If so, in what 
way?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
2) Actions 
and measures 
that have 
been 
implemented 
What measures have you, and has your city, taken to tackle the crisis 
mentioned in 1)? This may also require a brief description of your position and 
responsibilities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What have been the driving forces that motivate/pressure the city to take 
such actions?  
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3) How the 
situations and 
measures 
mentioned 
above have 
been handled 
As a member of EUROCITIES, to whom do you believe your actions, 
initiatives, and policy decisions are expected to reach out and respond? In 
other words, who are your stakeholders, and do they expand with the participation 
to EUROCITIES? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Does being a member to EUROCITIES and Migration and Integration 
Working Group impact your actions? In what way?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
With your answers to the previous question in mind, how did you and your 
city reach a decision to implement the actions/measures mentioned in 2)? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4) Closing 
questions 
Would you be comfortable stating that your city responded, and has been 
responding, to the EU refugee crisis (Yes / No), and doing so in a satisfactory 
manner (Yes / No)?  
 
 
 
 
 
Is there anything in handling the challenges concerning refugees and asylum 
seekers, to which you feel that Eurocities and the working group could 
contribute more? 
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There are scholars who point out that while transnational municipal 
networks lay out objectives that are problem-oriented and pragmatic, their 
roles remain rather symbolic. How would you respond to them? 
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Appendix 3 
Interview guide for the secretariat 
Interview Guide  
*The core questions are written in bold letters.  
*It is crucial for this project to hear your stories and narratives that supplement and elaborate 
factual statements.  
*Approximate duration of the interview session is 60 minutes. 
*The interview will be conducted in English. 
*The interviewer will record the session and refrain from taking intensive notes in order to 
engage herself in the conversation. 
 
Secretariat functions: Brussels office 
Research questions Interview questions 
1) What the network 
and working group 
experienced so far 
since the onset of the 
EU refugee/migration 
crisis. 
Please describe your role(s) in EUROCITIES and in Migration and 
Integration Working Group. 
 
 
 
 
Please describe the role(s) of the working group in relation to 
EUROCITIES as a whole and its member cities. 
 
 
 
 
Please describe the situation that EUROCITIES experienced in the 
refugee/migration crisis. For example, what was the crisis about for the 
network, and how did it affect the working group? Is something different 
before and after? 
 
 
 
 
2) Actions and 
measures that the 
working group has 
implemented, or 
assisted 
municipalities to 
implement. 
Who are your stakeholders? In other words, who or what entities and 
organizations do you take into consideration in your day-to-day operation? 
 
 
 
 
What were the actions you have taken in your capacity in an effort to 
address the crisis? Or how did you assist the working group and its 
members to take actions in their respective cities? 
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3) The roles and 
meanings of the 
network (whether 
and how being 
connected influenced 
the actions 
mentioned above). 
With the previous two questions in mind, do you see being a member to 
EUROCITIES and Migration and Integration Working Group impact 
the decisions and actions of the member cities?  In other words, would 
any outcome have been different without the network, and in what way? 
 
 
 
 
Is there anything in handling the challenges concerning refugees and 
asylum seekers, to which you feel that the EUROCITIES and the 
working group could contribute more? 
 
 
 
 
4) Closing questions There are scholars who point out that transnational municipal 
networks and their roles are rather symbolic while their objectives are 
problem-oriented and pragmatic. How would you respond to such 
voices? 
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Appendix 4 
Categories Codes Subcodes Definitions Examples (Shorter excerpts) Counts 
What the 
crisis was 
about 
Emergency 
reception -- 
The 
interviewees 
directly 
experienced an 
influx of people 
People arrived at the railway 
stations, and what happened 
was that we received a phone 
call from, I don’t know how 
you call it, the guys that check 
your tickets, when train left up 
north, telling “now we have 35 
people coming to [your city]” 
or “now we have 40 persons 
coming to [your city]” and so 
on. Every night some hours 
before the arrival, we had 
these calls and had to take 
some action. (Interviewee A) 
8 
Planned 
integration -- 
The 
interviewees are 
in the situation 
to be able to 
envision in a 
longer-term and 
integrate 
refugees 
What I found was that when I 
was attending these meetings, 
the discussions were around 
the huge emergencies, such as 
cities like Athens, and what 
they were dealing with 
because of where they were 
based and the islands around 
Greece. Our city, on the other 
hand, is not on the border; it’s 
set inland, [inaudible] 
compared to other European 
cities, and I just felt that we 
were ahead in terms of 
integration, but integration was 
not the primary focus of the 
working group at the time 
because they were dealing 
with these huge emergencies. 
(Interviewee C) 
7 
Expected 
behavior Reciprocity  
Learning 
and sharing 
Actors share 
ideas and learn 
from each other. 
It is great being involved in 
EUROCITIES because I can 
tap into some fantastic friends 
and colleagues, you can just 
contact right away and have a 
discussion. We often refer 
cities to each other. “Have a 
chat with Berlin”, that sort of 
thing. It is really positive in 
that respect. (Interviewee C) 
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Regional 
discrepanc
y 
The imbalance 
of reciprocity of 
sharing and 
learning among 
the peers. 
While we are facing 
emergencies, they are really 
integrating people. I think at 
the moment; we are going in 
reverse. Our problem at the 
moment is not even 
integration. It is the reception 
again. (Interviewee B) 
3 
Facilitating 
governance 
arrangement 
Coordination 
Robust 
structure 
Coordination is 
ensured through 
a robust local 
structure. 
We have what we call 
Migration Strategic Board, 
which oversees migration in 
the city, brings together 
partners to understand 
migration, and collectively 
looks for solutions. All 
migration work reports to this 
particular board. The chair of 
this board is an advisor to the 
national government. You 
have a really good link there. 
(Interviewee C) 
2 
Ad-hoc 
endorseme
nt and 
manageme
nt 
Coordination is 
ensured through 
endorsing and 
managing local 
organizations. 
During 2014, the municipality 
organized a more central 
system for reception because 
as you can imagine you could 
not keep men and women, 
aged and minors, all together 
in the center. So, the 
municipality signed a protocol 
with the Home Office, the 
interior ministry. (Interviewee 
B) 
6 
Steering 
(non-
binding) 
Policy 
framework
s 
Steering is 
ensured through 
setting the 
terms of policy 
frameworks. 
By signing the charter, cities 
engage themselves to reach 
these commitments in the 
overall integration as well as 
integration through services. 
Within the framework of 
Integrating Cities, we run the 
projects [...] and try to 
implement them in a way that 
resonates with the 
commitments that the cities 
have signed up for. Every two 
years, we compile a report on 
the progress the cities have 
made. (Interviewee E) 
3 
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Funded 
projects 
Steering is 
ensured through 
operating 
funded projects. 
We got a grant from the Open 
Society Institute, to prepare for 
two mentoring visits on the 
integration of young refugees 
and education. For this, we 
launched a call in the working 
group announcing two cities 
would be hosting mentoring 
visits, where two additional 
cities that are more advanced 
on the topic [make a visit] as a 
mentor, and they exchange 
experiences. (Interviewee E) 
4 
Delegation -- 
The secretariat 
acts and speaks 
on behalf of the 
member cities. 
Some cities are transit places, 
others are the destination, and 
even within these 
classifications, every city faces 
different challenges because 
they are the frontline of the 
internal reception. Cities are 
where people actually come. 
Even if it is only for transit, 
they come. (Interviewee E) 
4 
Challenges 
and 
obstacles 
Jurisdictional 
tension 
National 
legislations 
and 
decisions 
National 
legislations 
decisions are 
creating an 
interruption at 
the municipal 
level. 
As you probably know, as one 
of the latest developments, 
with a new government and 
new Home office, the law 
changed in December 2018. 
The law regarding asylum 
became much stricter. It 
became nearly impossible for 
these people to obtain the 
status as a refugee. It has been 
two months, and we really see 
how the situation has started 
changing again. (Interviewee 
B) 
7 
Intergovern
mental 
agreements 
National 
decisions made 
at the 
intergovernmen
tal level are 
creating an 
interruption at 
the municipal 
level. 
In 2014 and 2015, the 
reception system became 
better and better. In 2016, the 
Schengen Agreement became 
suspended. Germany, Norway, 
France, and Austria, decided to 
close their border as if they 
were trying to say “this is 
enough, you should do 
something to identify people 
2 
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and stop them. It is not 
acceptable that all of them are 
just crossing the border 
without control”. Because the 
borders were closed, we were 
forced to start identifying them 
and realized that now they had 
to stay longer in our city. 
(Interviewee B) 
Organization
al gap -- 
Obstacles that 
creates 
discontinuity in 
realizing the 
goals. 
Quite recently a new working 
group was created on drug 
abuse, that was quite 
interesting for our city, so I 
contacted different areas in the 
city council, which were youth 
and health. Then there was the 
problem of language. Most 
people in these areas were 
quite close to retiring [...] and 
their English was not very 
good, so this was creating 
difficulty with participating 
actively in the debate within a 
working group. (Interviewee 
D) 
4 
Inner logic 
Limits of 
competenc
e  
Municipalities 
recognize the 
limits in the 
competency of 
the network. 
I do not think there is much 
more that EUROCITIES could 
do with the resources they 
have. I think it is important 
that there is our voice in 
discussions with the 
Commission. (Interviewee A) 
2 
Self-
evaluation 
Whether the 
interviewees 
believe their 
municipality 
has dealt with 
the crisis in a 
satisfactory 
manner. 
Yes. I would think our 
municipality is investing a lot 
of people working on this issue 
to face the situation. I think we 
are doing our best in the 
situation. (Interviewee B) 
2 
Rationaliza
tion of 
organizatio
nal flaws 
How the 
interviewees 
make sense of 
the flaws in the 
network, 
provided they 
are aware of the 
I have to say we are the ones 
to make the network useful. Of 
course, I can’t influence too 
much on who is working there 
or what kind of contacts they 
have within the Commission, 
but what I can do from here is 
3 
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limits of the 
network's 
competency and 
they are doing 
the best they 
can. 
actively taking part. 
(Interviewee A) 
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